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ABSTRACT 
 
ISLAM, SOCIALISM AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE:  
THE CASE OF EMEK VE ADALET PLATFORMU 
 
Güner, Emel. 
MA in Cultural Studies  
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof.  Ebru Kayaalp 
August 2018, 97 pages 
 
This thesis analyzes the collaborative political project of the left wing and Islamic 
thought in Turkey. The relationship between left-wing thought in Islam, the public 
sphere, and democracy are absent from the main topics of discussion in the existing 
sociological literature. Nevertheless, the recent appearance of non-orthodox 
strands of Islamic political thought in the Turkish public sphere is noteworthy in a 
country where the state has traditionally sought to dominate discourses on religion 
and the economy. This thesis examines whether a collaborative discourse between 
the left and Islam can open up an enhanced, pluralistic, and inclusive public sphere 
using the case study of Emek ve Adalet Platformu. Emek ve Adalet Platformu (Labor 
and Justice Platform) is a movement that has attempted to unite Islamic and 
socialist sensibilities by taking the Quran’s approach to social justice as a reference 
point for solving social, economic, and political problems. Based on open-ended 
interviews with six activists in the movement, this thesis locates Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu as a reflection of sol ilahiyat (leftist theology) in the public sphere and 
analyzes the movement’s role there using the concepts of plurality, subaltern 
counterpublic, democratic ethos, and enlarged mentality. While these concepts do 
enable the movement to carve out a more pluralistic, inclusive space, certain 
factors internal to the movement limit its ability to open up the public sphere. 
 
Keywords: public sphere, subaltern counterpublic, Arendt, sol ilahiyat (leftist 
theology), Turkey 
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ÖZ 
 
İSLAM, SOSYALİZM VE KAMUSAL ALAN:  
BİR VAKA ÇALIŞMASI OLARAK EMEK VE ADALET PLATFORMU 
 
Güner, Emel. 
Kültürel Çalışmalar Yüksek Lisans Programı  
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Ebru Kayaalp 
Ağustos 2018, 97 sayfa 
 
Bu tez Türkiye’de sol ve İslami düşüncenin ortak siyasi projesini incelemektedir. 
İslam’daki sol temayül, kamusal alan ve demokrasi mevcut sosyolojik literatürde 
bulunmamaktadır. Buna karşın, devletin geleneksel olarak din ve ekonomiye dair 
söylemler üzerinde baskın aktör olduğu  Türkiye kamusal alanında, alışılmışın 
dışında İslami düşünce tonlarının orataya çıkışı kayda değer bir noktadır. Bu tez 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu’nu bir vaka çalışması olarak kullanarak sol ve İslam 
arasındaki ortak söylemin gelişmiş, çoğulcu ve kapsayıcı bir kamusal alanın tesisine 
katkısını araştırmaktadır. Emek ve Adalet Platformu, Kur’an-ı Kerim’in sosyal adalet 
yaklaşımını sosyal, ekonomik ve politik problemlerin çözümünde referans noktası 
kabul ederek İslami ve sosyalist hassasiyetleri bir araya getirmiş bir harekettir. 
Hareketteki 6 aktivist ile gerçekleştirilen açık uçlu görüşmeler temel alınarak bu tez, 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu’nu kamusal alanda “sol ilahiyat”ın  bir yansıması olarak 
konumlamakta ve bu alanda haretin rolünü çoğulluk, subaltern counterpublic (karşıt 
kamusal alan), demokratik ethos ve genişletilmiş zihniyet kavramları ile 
ilişkilendirerek analiz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda hareket daha çoğulcu ve kapsayıcı 
bir alanın oluşmasına hizmet ederken, harekete dair bir takım içsel faktörler 
hareketin kamusal alanı açma kabiliyetini kısıtlamaktadır.    
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: kamusal alan, subaltern counterpublic (karşıt kamusal alan), 
Arendt, sol ilahiyat, Türkiye  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
When, one day, a naïve question occurred to me—“Can Islam and the left be 
reconciled in Turkey?”—friends who learned that I had a curiosity for this subject 
informed me about the existence of a movement, Emek ve Adalet Platformu [Labor 
and Justice Platform], which could serve as the answer to my question. And so it 
was, that night in Beşiktaş, after many teas and long conversations, that my path 
crossed that of Emek ve Adalet Platformu. Until today Islam and Marxism have 
generally been discussed as separate subjects in the literature. There has been a 
literature that considers these two concepts together and focuses on a few key 
names like Ali Shariati or movements like Liberation Theology. In Turkey, scholars 
have recently begun to discuss the notion of a “sol ilahiyat”1 [leftist theology], 
aimed at combining the left and Islam. Unfortunately, however, all of these 
discussions have only produced a limited literature. Moreover, despite being the 
platform for relevant political action and social interactions, the concept of the 
“public sphere” is largely missing from these discussions. 
 
Before attending to the specific example of the Islamic left in the public sphere, it is 
worthwhile reviewing the key discussion regarding the Islamic public sphere in 
general. While many have pointed to the lack of a strong, vibrant or autonomous 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 The literature discusses whether to translate ilahiyat as teoloji (theology). Some use “theology” as a 
direct translation of ilahiyat, as seen in the frequent translation of ilahiyat fakültesi as “school of 
theology.” Others make a distinction between theology in the Western tradition and ilahiyat in the 
Islamic tradition. The former, they say, is more related to politics, while the second is more strictly 
related to religion. For example, in “The Republic,” Plato classifies theology as a part of political 
science, “which taught the few how to rule the many” (Arendt, 1961, p. 131). The god of theology is 
a political device defined by Plato as “the measurement of measurements”. Thus, in its Platonic 
understanding, theology is a standard that determines the rules of behavior, the basis on which 
polities are founded, and as a guide to enforce these standards (p. 131). Meanwhile, Necdet Subaşı 
(2003) defines “ilahiyat” in Turkey as a study of how to live according to the principles of Islam and 
does not focus on the philosophical aspect of religion (Subaşı, 2003). Mustafa Öztürk (2017) does not 
argue that Islam lacks theology, but asserts that ilahiyat corresponds to the discipline of kelam a 
branch of Islamic learning which relies heavily on reason in addition to the written word in the Quran 
to define the principles of belief and action. I would like to thank Besim Dellaloğlu for drawing my 
attention to this point. 
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public sphere or civil society in Muslim societies, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2006) 
opposes this dominant view, arguing that its defenders falsely point to a certain 
kind of Oriental despotism (Eisenstadt, 2006, p. 306). Problematizing such a 
conceptualization, Eisenstadt points to the ulama’s discussions over 
madhhab/mezhep (schools of law), the waqf/vakıf (charitable endowment) and 
different Sufi orders as the constitutive components of the public sphere in Muslim 
societies (p. 308). He defines these public spheres autonomous arenas, since they 
held separate criteria for recruitment and action (p. 314). On the one hand, these 
spheres are grounds on which different segments of society could raise their voices 
in the name of Islamic principles; on the other hand, these are arenas that created 
wide, trans-state networks in which confrontational stances could also emerge (p. 
314). 
 
With regard to society, Eisenstadt places the ideal of the ummah/ümmet as the 
“principled political equality of all believers” as a central factor in the constitution of 
public spheres (p. 309) However, even if this signals vibrancy in the public sphere, 
this did not point to a direct access to the political arena (Eisenstadt, 2006, p. 310). 
At this point, Eisenstadt emphasizes the decoupling of “the make-up of the public 
sphere and access to the political arena” (Eisenstadt, 2006, p. 310-311). Therefore, 
Eisenstadt defines a public sphere that is both influenced by Islam and by the 
“relative distance from direct involvement in political decision making” (p. 312). It is 
not because of a lack of public sphere, but because of its isolation from the political 
sphere that “outburst” and rebellion act as the sole mechanisms through which 
society can express its most pressing political demands (p. 321). The Muslim public 
sphere is not made up of static institutions, but changes over time. Eisenstadt 
identifies modern Muslim public spheres with the emergence of multiple new 
actors and associations such as intellectuals, professionals and experts (p.314) along 
with the development of new religious groups and movements (p. 315). All of these 
groups have created new spaces of action and a common ground on which they 
developed confrontation, competition and cooperation. Thus the separation 
between the public sphere and the political arena has disappeared, and a more 
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direct engagement both to the public sphere and to the political arena has emerged 
(p. 315). 
 
Nilüfer Göle adds a valuable aspect to this discussion by pointing to the multiplicity 
of alternative public spheres rather than the existence of one single public sphere in 
a society. This is particularly apparent in the case of Muslim migrants in Europe. The 
encounter between Muslims and Europeans has triggered public debates which 
have reshaped and expanded the public sphere (Göle, 2017; 2013). Göle indicates 
that the presence of headscarved women in schools, burqinis, the construction of 
mosques, or the sale of halal food, among others, have all contributed to the 
increased visibility and audibility of Muslim migrants (Göle, 2017, pp. 62-63). In 
turn, Islam in the public sphere has diffused into areas like art, fashion, finance and 
commerce. Göle places these Islamic manifestations as a mode of “public agency” 
and as an “act of citizenship” (Göle, 2013, p. 12), concepts which will remain 
familiar in our discussion of Emek ve Adalet Platformu below. The clash between a 
European public sphere, which had to redefine its Europeanness in light of the 
presence of Muslims, and a Muslim migrant sphere, which had to reinterpret the 
norms and practices of Muslimhood through interactions with European life, has 
promoted the creation of new publics. In Göle’s words, “Controversies create 
collages and assemble diverse actors, cultures and spaces” (Göle, 2013, p. 11; Göle, 
2017, p. 120, p. 122). In this sense, Islam and Muslimhood have played a 
transformative role in the European public spheres and have resulted in a 
reorganization of these spaces (Göle, 2017, p.55, p. 85). 
 
The relationship between the Islam of the left, the public sphere, and democracy, 
however, has remained absent from the main topics of discussion in the existing 
literature. This thesis focuses on this gap and aims to analyze the collaborative 
political project of the left wing and Islamic thought in Turkey. It questions whether 
a collaborative discourse between the left and Islam could open up an enhanced, 
pluralistic, and inclusive public sphere. While developing this argument, I use the 
case study of Emek ve Adalet Platformu, a movement that has attempted to unite 
Islamic and socialist sensibilities by taking the Quran’s approach to social justice as a 
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reference point for solving social, economic, and political problems. In this thesis, I 
will first give a picture of the historical relationship between religion and socialism. 
Then I will narrow down the scope and look at the reflections of this relationship 
first in Christianity and then in Islam. Finally, with regard to this discussion, I 
examine the responses of six activists in the movement both to create an “identity 
card” for the movement and to locate the movement in the public sphere and 
clarify its contributions to the public sphere. By focusing on the movement in the 
public sphere and analyzing the interviews of my informants, this thesis will analyze 
these responses using the concepts of plurality, subaltern counterpublic, 
democratic ethos, and enlarged mentality in relation to the public sphere.  
 
When we look at the main discussions in the literature that attempts to rethink the 
relationship between Islam and socialism, the arguments usually start with Marx’s 
famous quotation: “religion is the opium of the people”. As a result, the literature 
mostly emphasizes the incompatibility of socialism and Islam. Marx, as one of the 
fathers of socialism, is blamed for promoting atheism and rejecting religion. 
However, the literature also features an alternative discussion, one that views 
Marx’s argumentation from a dual perspective. According to this discussion, on the 
one hand, Marx underlines religion’s principle of unconditional obedience, one that 
sovereign powers could take advantage of; yet on the other hand, Marx emphasizes 
the revolutionary potential of religion which could fuel emancipation. This 
revolutionary potential was stressed also by Friedrich Engels and Rosa Luxemburg, 
who both drew a correspondence between early Christianity and socialism.  
 
As a concrete example of this correspondence, I will examine Liberation Theology, 
which can be defined as a religious movement that used Marxist concepts. Then I 
will search for the traces of a similar relationship in Islam and introduce figures like 
Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, Ali Shariati, and Mustafa Sibai, who attempted to 
combine Islam and socialism in different ways. In relation to this discussion I will 
analyze the main discussions regarding a “sol ilahiyat” in Islam. Finally, I will 
examine the relationship between religion and socialism in Turkey, including the 
emergence of a “Muslim capitalism” through the integration of religious 
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bourgeoisie into capitalism and the opening of a possibility for “sol ilahiyat” in 
Turkey through the capitalist system’s “defeat” of Islamists and the left. These 
discussions are the primary focus of Chapter 2.   
As a movement that practices struggle and resistance outside the traditional 
confines of Islamism and the left, Emek ve Adalet Platformu will be the center of my 
focus in Chapter 3. I will introduce the emergence and development of the 
movement, the characteristics of its founding cadre, its structure, organizational 
processes, participant profile as well as its political stance. These considerations will 
be based directly on the responses of my interviewees. Thus, in Chapter 3, I will 
create an “identity card” for the movement to locate the movement in the public 
sphere as an example of “sol ilahiyat”.      
 
Following this identity analysis, in Chapter 4, I will define the public sphere from an 
Arendtian perspective. Hannah Arendt’s theorization of the public sphere is a 
valuable approach to understanding the role of Emek ve Adalet Platformu in Turkey. 
I will discuss the plurality the movement created in the Turkish public sphere, or 
“space of appearances.” In addition to the variety it brought to the public sphere, 
the movement also forms a subaltern counterpublic, a discursive sphere that is 
constituted by disadvantaged groups to be seen and recognized by others. Here I 
will discuss the extent to which the movement itself constitutes a subaltern 
counterpublic. In relation to this discussion, I will introduce the term democratic 
ethos, based on the definitions of the scholars like William Connolly and Peter 
Euben. I will assert that Emek ve Adalet Platformu creates a democratic ethos in the 
public sphere and so enlarges mentalities. “Enlarged mentality” is a concept 
discussed by Hannah Arendt. Benefitting from her conceptualization, in this section, 
I reveal how the movement seeks to enlarge mentalities through specific social 
practices and actions. In last section of this chapter, I will draw attention to a 
paradox in the movement and claim that despite the democratic ethos it has 
exemplified in public, the movement suffers internally from male domination, a 
monolithic structure, heteronormativity and a monolithic focus on Islam and labor 
that may lead to an arbitrary prioritization between social problems.  
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1.1 Methodology 
1.1.1. Research Process 
When I first decided to research the possibility of togetherness between religion 
and socialism, I began by reading about the most prominent figures in Islam who 
attempted to create a bridge between religion and Islam: Ali Shariati, Mahmoud 
Muhammad Taha, and Mustafa Sibai. I sought to compare this example with those 
in Christianity, looking specifically at Liberation Theology, a movement that bases its 
social struggle on both Christian thought and Marxist discourse. Unfortunately, in 
international journals, there were not many sources that dealt with cases that 
exemplify the correspondence between socialism and Islam, or, more narrowly, that 
were specific to Turkey. One of the few major discussions was an article series I 
encountered in the journal Birikim concerning the possibility and sustainability of 
“sol ilahiyat” in Turkey. A book by Kazım Özdoğan and Derviş Aydın Akkoç, Sol 
İlahiyat-Dini Soldan Okumak [Leftist Theology-Reading Religion from the Left] 
compiles the discussion in Birikim and also brings new perspectives to the 
discussion with new articles. These two local publications became my staring point 
and gave me a general overview regarding the ways of thinking about the 
relationship between Islam and socialism in Turkey. These readings also made me 
aware of something: During my research, I saw that even though all these 
discussions took place in the public sphere, a conceptualization of the “public 
sphere” itself was missing in the literature. To put it differently, an analytical 
approach regarding sol ilahiyat and its representatives in the public sphere was 
either superficial or non-existing. Thus I started to conduct this research focusing on 
this gap. 
 
Over the course of seven months, from December 2013 to June 2014, I conducted 
in-depth, open-ended, and semi-structured interviews. I asked simple and short 
questions and tried not to intervene or lead my research participants during our 
talks. I designed 25 questions and directed them to six people (two female, four 
male). All of the interviews were conducted according to the time and date that was 
set by the interviewees and each lasted approximately two hours. All of the 
interviews took place in locations determined by my informants. The snowball 
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method was used for the selection of research participants. My friends who 
graduated from Boğaziçi University (the movement has ties with this university in 
terms of both participants and the founding cadre) provided the initial starting 
point for my research. Since I reached most of my interviewees through their 
personal networks, it was not difficult to establish a relationship of trust.     
 
My research participants were usually open to talking about the movement and 
willing to explain their actions and practices. At the same time, however, they were 
careful not to speak definitively on behalf of the movement as a whole. In this 
regard, my interviewees used the word “we” when referring to issues that the 
movement agreed on, but on points for which no agreement had been reached, 
they emphasized the fact that they spoke only for themselves. Similar to the 
attitude taken when there was a conflicting stance with the movement, they did 
this also for the issues that were still being negotiated. This happened when the 
movement was still discussing pending or unclear stances on some issues, including 
the Kurdish or Alevi movements or concepts like homeland or nation. Here, my 
respondents always began by emphasizing that they were talking on their own 
behalf, not for the movement.  
 
I did not encounter any reactions about the sincerity of my intentions. My friends 
became my references and helped facilitate the interview and snowballing process. 
Also being the topic of a thesis was an attractive position for my respondents, who 
were members of a movement aiming to create social change through public 
awareness. In this sense, this thesis would be, from their perspective, a medium 
that would carry their words to a wider public. All my respondents helped me a lot, 
approached me with friendship, and expressed their joy in contributing to my 
thesis. This situation increased my motivation, while their active participation, 
openness, and supportive approach all increased the variety of information we 
were able to discuss in our conversations. Thus, our interviews were transformed 
into fruitful discussion sessions rather than the question-answer format of a formal 
survey. I learned a lot from their stories, as the real experiences shared naturally 
went beyond the information presented on the movement’s website or in the 
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books. I appreciate their devotion, determination to create change, and sensitivity 
towards injustices. They present a different color and voice in the public sphere 
which I find very valuable regardless of what they defend. Along with this, however, 
I believe every movement should be open to development and criticism. For this 
reason, remaining objective, I also show the weaknesses of the movement and the 
paradoxes that are inherent in it.  
 
Although I considered the interviews I conducted very fruitful, I am conscious of the 
biases that arise out of this method. I learned the stories that my interviewees 
chose to tell me. To put it differently, my information depends on the extent of the 
experiences that they wanted to share with me. Undoubtedly, personal perceptions 
are relative and plural. Moreover, they might have instinctively refrained from 
bringing up some issues, thinking that it would put the movement into a difficult 
position. They might have subjectively put the movement in a more positive light, or 
they might have simply forgotten some aspects while we were having conversation. 
As a result, it is important to keep in mind that the analysis in this dissertation is 
based primarily on the information that my respondents chose to share with me.  
 
1.2 Profiles of the Interviewees 
As a part of my research project, over the course of seven months from December 
2013 to June 2014 I interviewed two female and four male participants. 
Participants’ names have been altered in this thesis to protect their privacy. Using 
my interviewees’ own responses in this section I will present profiles of participants 
in Emek ve Adalet Platformu charting how they joined and integrated into the 
movement.  
 
Ali was born in Malatya, in 1983. He currently works as a civil servant at a state 
institution. He describes himself as someone who has a background in Islamism 
(İslamcılıktan gelen biri). He has been an activist since his high-school years. He 
joined Emek ve Adalet Platformu after his graduation from the university. 
Questioning the evolution of liberalism and observing the destructive effects of 
capitalism, he began to look for an alternative path. While the left represented one 
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way of criticizing liberalism and capitalism, Ali was disturbed by what he saw as the 
existence of hierarchy and a patronizing reflex that aims at educating common 
people among leftist organizations. His search for something else and his struggle to 
create a personally relevant discourse against capitalism led him to cross paths with 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu. There he began to attempt to produce an Islamically 
rooted discourse targeted at capitalism together with the other members of the 
movement.  
 
Fatma was born in Bozhöyük, in 1979. She also currently works as a civil servant at a 
state institution. She told me that her political identity was shaped during her high 
school years. As a person who grew up in a town of workers and factories, she 
started to think on the concept of “labor”. During her university years, she observed 
some of the leftist groups and, though she never joined such groups officially, she 
did make an effort to develop herself theoretically. After moving to Istanbul her 
focus shifted from labor to concepts like populism [halkçılık], localism 
[yerellik/yerlilik], Islam, and what it meant to be a Muslim. She and her friends 
founded a reading group, where they met with figures like İhsan Eliaçık, Zeki 
Kılıçaslan, Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, İlhami Güler, and Mehmet Bekaroğlu, all prominent 
thinkers who were grappling with the same issues. These meetings expanded their 
circle and enabled new encounters with people from different backgrounds. In this 
way, Fatma and her leftist community met new people from what Fatma called the 
“Muslim neighborhood”. Fatma thus became one of the founders of Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu . 
 
Mehmet was born in Istanbul, in 1988. He is the second son of a family of workers. 
He describes his family as Islamist. He was a student at the time we held our 
interview. His integration into the movement began during his university years. He 
did not exactly tell how he became a member but defined the emergence of the 
movement as follows: “At Boğaziçi University, and partially at Bilgi University, 
revolutionary [leftist] and Islamist groups came up with political practices by 
forming smaller networks and enabling informal encounters. The sum of all these 
cultures led to the Emek ve Adalet Platformu initiative”. 
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Ayşe was born in Istanbul, in 1988. She defines her family as religious. She is 
currently a civil servant at a state institution. During her university years, she took 
part in discussions about how religious and non-religious people could come 
together to act jointly in politics. She told me that she saw Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu as a place that could act and struggle in hybrid environments, where 
people from different ideological backgrounds could coexist. Her social network has 
a major role in establishing connections with the movement. Thus, Ayşe’s own 
curiosity with regard to social problems and her friends acted as catalysts that 
enabled her integration in the movement.   
 
Barış was born in Malatya, in 1986. His family is a family of workers. He described 
his father as a figure with connections to leftist organizations. When we held our 
interview, he was both a student and a civil servant at a state institution. His friends 
and social network had ties to Emek ve Adalet Platformu. Barış told me that he 
viewed environments where social justice and Islam discourses were both brought 
up as places where hope could emerge. His hope for such discussions led him to join 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu.  
 
Tarık was born in 1988. He is from a family of bureaucrats. He, too currently works 
as a civil servant. His participation in the movement started through his friends from 
the university. They told him about a conference being held by Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu. His participation in this conference enabled him to meet other members 
of the movement, who invited him to join their weekly meetings. He was pleasantly 
surprised by the very relaxed meeting experience, even at a political organization. 
While this atmosphere convinced him to participate in several more meetings, he 
left the movement after some time, since he could not understand what the 
platform would turn into. After a year of not participating in the movement, he 
helped members of Emek ve Adalet Platformu in planning one of its fast-breaking 
actions, and after this experience officially re-joined the movement.  
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
Based on the in-depth interviews with these respondents, this thesis aims to 
contribute to two main discussions. In the first part of this thesis, I present the first 
of these discussions, the potential compatibility of religion and Islam, and show the 
possibilities and obstacles, opportunities and criticisms brought up in the literature. 
In the second part of the thesis, I look at what this discussion means for the concept 
of the public sphere. Here, I present Emek ve Adalet Platformu as a concrete 
example of how the discussion of Islam and the left occurs in the public sphere. The 
overall aim of this thesis is thus to analyze the collaborative political project of the 
left and Islamic thought and to determine whether this discourse could open up an 
enhanced, pluralistic, and more inclusive public sphere. 
 
The following chapter starts with a comparative overview of the main discussions in 
the literature regarding the spaces where religion and socialism encounter each 
other, both in Christianity and Islam. Then I will narrow down my scope by 
specifically looking at the Turkish context and how some actors in this country have 
sought to bring Islam and socialism together.  
 
This more abstract discussion becomes more concrete in the third chapter with a 
focus on the social and political struggles of Emek ve Adalet Platformu. In this 
chapter, I create an “identity card” for the movement. I will discuss the emergence 
and development of the movement, the characteristics of its founding cadre, its 
structure and organizational processes, the participant profile, and its political 
stance.  
 
In the fourth and final chapter I attempt to correct the gap in the literature and 
focus my arguments on the concept of the public sphere. I use an Arendtian 
definition of the public sphere in order to question the kind of contributions that 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu provides to the public sphere. Is the public sphere always 
inclusive to all participants? If not, what does the movement do to open up a new 
space to be heard and recognized by others? What are the concepts of “democratic 
ethos” and “enlarged mentality” and how could they be linked to Emek ve Adalet 
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Platformu specific to public sphere? In answering such questions, I point out the 
potential for the movement but also highlight some of its paradoxes and limitations 
as an actor in the public sphere. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELIGION VERSUS SOCIALISM OR RELIGION WITH SOCIALISM 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Most people might believe that religion and leftist ideology are incompatible, given 
Karl Marx’s statement on religion being the opiate of the masses, and Bolshevism’s 
aggressive atheism. There have been many attempts to reconcile the two sides, 
however. This chapter looks at the development of such attempts in a cross-religion 
comparison. First, I will discuss the relationship between religion and socialism with 
reference to Marx and Engels. Then I will specifically look at the projections of this 
relationship in Christianity. Here, Rosa Luxemburg and her thoughts regarding the 
doctrines of religion in early Christianity play the central role. As a concrete example 
of Luxemburg’s argumentation, namely a harmony between socialism and early 
Christianity, I will briefly discuss Liberation Theology. Our discussion moves on to 
Islam in the next session, where I will trace the relationship between Islam and 
socialism. In this context, Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, Ali Shariati and Mustafa 
Sibai will be my lodestars as figures who combined Islam and socialism in the Islamic 
world. In the next section, I will chart the opinions about the possibility and 
sustainability of a sol ilahiyat [leftist theology] in Islam and the main axes of this 
discussion. In the following and last section, I will specifically look the relationship 
between religion and socialism in Turkey and to the phenomenon of “new 
Muslimhood,” which can be defined as the emergence of a new Muslim class 
integrated into capitalism.       
 
2.2. Oscillating between Obedience and Revolt: Where does Religion Stand? 
Though one might assume that Marxism cannot come to an agreement with 
religion, based on its famous “opium metaphor” of the obedience aspect of religion, 
the literature frequently dismisses such an assumption as being too reductionist. 
Kazım Özdoğan emphasizes that opium label is a deficient approach and opposes 
using this argument as evidence of Marx’s atheism or enmity toward religion. 
According to Özdoğan, in fact, Marx emphasized the dual nature of religion 
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(Özdoğan, 2010, p.26). On the one hand, Marx discusses the passivity-generating 
aspect of religion by explaining that religion has been an instrument that provides 
the survival of oppression and exploitative relationships imposed by sovereign 
powers instead of changing them (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 27;Tekin, 2010, p. 60). 
Attributing ultimate salvation to another world contributes to passivity by 
postponing worldly salvation and eventually internalizing existing injustices. The 
utopias of this world—namely freedom, equality, justice and happiness—appear as 
the promises of the hereafter due to the doctrine of predestination. In this regard, 
Yasin Durak explains the opium role of religion in the class struggle as one of 
religion’s ability to numb riot against the existing order (Durak, 2012, p.83). 
 
However, on the other hand Marx emphasizes that religion is also the heart and 
conscience of a heartless world (Tekin, 2010, p. 60). According to Engels, too, 
religion has a dual character, both a protestant and revolutionary aspect (Özdoğan, 
2010, p. 27). At this point, Engels draws a correspondence between Early 
Christianity, which was the religion of the slaves and the poor before Christianity 
became a state religion, and modern socialism and unites them at the common 
denominator of salvation with only one difference: “Early Christianity refers 
salvation to the hereafter whereas socialism waits for it in this world” (Özdoğan, 
2010, p.27; Sönmez, 2013b, p. 65). 
 
Rosa Luxemburg is another important name on the Left who points to Early 
Christianity as being the real socialism. In her work “Religion and Socialism” (2013), 
Rosa Luxemburg compares the earliest form of Christianity, which she believes 
fostered socialism, to the Church at the time in which she lived. The reasons for the 
present gap between the Church and socialism, she wrote, was based on the 
transformation of the Church as a propaganda instrument that functions against 
socialism. Luxemburg describes the Church as an institution which is blind to the 
oppression and starvation experienced by the poor, which have resigned 
themselves to the cruelty of the sovereign classes who persuade the people with 
the discourse of “patience” (Luxemburg, 2013, p. 140). Luxemburg argues that this 
situation harbors a contradiction in itself, because, she explains, one would expect a 
15 
 
religion which indicates that “it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of the 
needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God” in its precept to keep 
its door open to the struggle of the poor rather than the exploitation and 
oppression of the rich (p. 141). By specifying that what is lived was the opposite of 
this expectation, Luxemburg points to bishops and priests as the servants of the 
system that enslaves the poor and defenseless (p. 142).   
 
Luxemburg analyzes the evolution of the Church over time and explains that 
Christianity became the religion of the poor and incapacitated Roman proletariat as 
soon as it emerged (p. 145). This religion which appeared as a consolation and good 
tidings opposed social inequality and defended wealth parity in order to terminate 
the distinction between the poor and rich (p. 158). In this sense, the author defines 
the first apostles’ of Christianity as sincere communists (p.143). However 
Luxemburg also writes that Christianity could not protect this emergent soul, and 
that the clergy had transformed into a body that accumulated wealth by 
collaborating with the upper classes. Thus, the Church became an institution that 
reproduced inequality and injustice. The author emphasizes that this collaboration 
continued with the emergence of modern capitalism (p. 158) and writes that this 
time an organic bond between clergy and capitalist classes, and thus a mandatory 
collaboration, emerged. Luxemburg explains that the Church approaches the well-
educated and socialism with hatred since the promises of socialism, namely equality 
and non-exploitation, would destroy the clergy who produced its wealth and 
accordingly its power from inequality and exploitation   (p. 164). Accordingly, she 
indicates that the Church asserted destiny and God’s will as the reasons for poverty 
rather than pointing to social conditions in order to legitimize its attitude and thus 
deceiving the people (p. 165). In this context, Luxemburg explains that what should 
be done is not “espousing” that which is put forward by the Church, but rather to 
support socialism in the struggle for freedom and equality. Via this discourse, 
Luxemburg shows an effort to apply the societal aspect of religion to the labor 
movement (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 28).  
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We can look at Liberation Theology as a movement that made Rosa Luxemburg’s 
effort real. Liberation Theology was a new form of theology that started in Latin 
America under the leadership of certain Catholic priests, and then found its place in 
other Christian sects and other religions. Liberation Theology argues that salvation 
should primarily be realized in this world and calls people to revolt against injustice. 
Moreover, it legitimizes this call using religious justifications (Kuyurtar, 2013, p. 
195). In this sense, even if Liberation Theology embraces the poor with a spiritual 
understanding based on morality and the Bible, it does not tackle salvation only 
with its as a spiritual matter; the Liberation Theology movement also espouses 
social, political and economic change (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 30). From this angle, it is a 
religious movement that uses Marxist concepts (Löwy, 1996, p. 26). 
 
Liberation Theology believes that capitalism lies at the root of ongoing injustice and 
inequality (Kuyurtar, 2013, p. 196). Accordingly it defines capitalism as a “structural 
sin” that drags people into inhumane conditions and claims that poverty can only be 
overcome by a political struggle that aims at terminating this structural sin 
(Kuyurtar, 2013, p. 203). This struggle reflects a Marxist perspective because 
according to the supporters of Liberation Theology, Marxism provides historically 
determined proof of the necessity of taking side with the poor (Kuyurtar, 2013, p. 
205). To put it in another way, Liberation Theology makes a Marxist reading “in 
order to understand the reasons for poverty, contradictions of capitalism, and class 
struggle” (Löwy, 1996, p. 43).  
 
Liberation Theology is a project of the poor and its theoreticians are the 
interpreters of the oppressed (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 29). Proponents of Liberation 
Theology argue that the poor are not an object that should be approached with 
compassion; rather they are the subjects of their own liberation (Löwy, 1996, p. 
102). Liberation theology explains that the society does not divide between the 
believers and atheists, but between the oppressor and the oppressed. In the world 
of those who struggle for justice, God is the God of the poor (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 30). 
In this sense, Liberation Theology calls for revolt and positions the Church as the 
guide of this revolt. Thus Liberation Theology reveals the utopian and rebellious 
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potential of religion and demonstrates that religion can have stimulating, triggering 
and energizer functions (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 29). 
 
With similar motives, attempts to combine religion and socialism have also occurred 
in the Islamic world. People like Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, Ali Shariati and 
Mustafa Sibai reinterpreted socialism with Islam as a guide against the inequalities 
and injustices of this world. These critical thinkers will be introduced in the 
following section. 
 
2.2.1. Mahmoud Muhammad Taha 
The Sudanese Islamic scholar Mahmoud Muhammad Taha2 sought to develop an 
egalitarian and humanitarian understanding of Islam by embracing new 
interpretations of the Quran. In his reading, Taha reverses the concept of “nesih” 3, 
arguing that when that suitable conditions were not yet in place in order to 
implement a verse in Quran, the precept in question would have to be postponed 
and a temporary order (emir) would be applied instead of this precept (hüküm) 
(Sönmez, 2008). Accordingly, Islam had narrowed its ideal according to the 
conditions at the time in order to conform to people’s level at that time and to 
make the message understandable in the societies where it was introduced 
(Sönmez, 2013a, p. 46). The religion known today is the religion that has been 
narrowed down, or, expressed with Taha’s terminology; this religion is simply the 
first message of Islam (Sönmez, 2013a, p. 46). Yet Islam also has a second message 
of equality. In this context, according to Taha, jihad, the inequality of women and 
men, polygamy, divorce, covering of women and the division between women and 
men are not the basic precepts of Islam; they are auxiliary messages of Islam which 
emerged according to the conditions of the period (Kıranşal, 2009, p. 84).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
2 Mahmoud Muhammad Taha (1909-1985) is a Sudanese thinker, reformer and leader of 
“Republican Brothers and Sisters” who was executed in 1985. 
 
3 Nesih is the process by which a new ayet invalidates an older ayet if the two are in conflict. Taha 
changes this process by not invalidating the previous ayet but by “postponing” its implementation. 
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Thus Taha emphasizes the necessity of realizing the unimplemented, postponed 
precepts that he calls Islam’s second message (Sönmez, 2008). This second meaning 
points to a socialist order. In other words, the society model that is advised by 
Quran is in fact a socialist society basing on economic, politic and societal equality 
(Kıranşal, 2009, p. 81). In fact, this socialist society was also, according to Taha, 
adopted by the Prophet, while the hadith “people are partners in three things: 
water, fire and pastures/grass” [insanlar üç şeyde ortaktır: su, ateş, mera] becomes 
the most explicit evidence of the need for constructing socialism (p. 82). In this 
regard, Taha depicts a social order where people have equal incomes, no one 
monopolizes the means of production, and each citizen has no private property 
other than a home, furniture and car (p. 83). Thus Taha presents a way of thinking 
that is partially affected by Marxism and creates a genuine Islamic socialism, even if 
it does not perfectly match with Marxism (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 32). 
 
2.2.2. Ali Shariati 
Ali Shariati4 enumerates the basic calamities that Iran has to struggle as 
“imperialism, racism, class exploitation, class oppression, class inequality and 
gharbzadegi (intoxication with the west)” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 26). In order to 
fight against these calamities, Shariati developed a discourse of “bazgaşt beh 
hiştan” [return to oneself], explaining this idea as follows: 
 
When we talk about a “return to the self,” we are really discussing the 
return of people to their cultural roots. […] There are those among us who 
may conclude that we Iranians ought to return to our Aryan roots. I reject 
this argument categorically. I oppose racism, fascism, and reactionary 
thought. Furthermore, the Islamic civilization served as a scissors to cut us 
off completely from our pre-Islamic past. … Thus, to return to our roots does 
not mean rediscovering a pre-Islamic Iran, but rather to return to our Islamic 
roots (as cited in Boroujerdi, 2001, pp. 154-155).  
 
 
 
4 Ali Shariati (1933-1977) is an Iranian intellectual and revolutionary. He has developed new 
perspectives regarding sociology of religion and tried to present a genuine picture of Islam. 
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Thus he calls on Third World countries to rediscover their national heritage, roots 
and culture while turning their backs on Europe in order to defeat imperialism and 
cope with its consequences (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 27): “Let us leave Europe, 
friends, let us give up our ape-like imitation of Europe. Let us leave Europe behind, 
that Europe which speaks constantly of humanity but actually destroys humanity 
wherever it is found”. (Boroujerdi, 2001, p. 156). After proving prescription for 
these long-term enemies of society, he focuses on the immediate enemies in Iran 
society, which are “vulgar Marxism” and “conservative Islam” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 
26).  
 
While rejecting vulgar Marxism, Shariati embraces the Marxist paradigm that 
divides society into a socioeconomic base and a political superstructure 
(Abrahamian, 1982, p.27). In his depiction, infrastructure consists of capitalism, 
abuse and exploitation, while the superstructure consists of morals, justice and 
taqva. In this system there is a relationship of dependency between the ruler and 
the religious clergy (Sönmez, 2013b, p.58).  
 
As for Marx’s statement that “the religion is the opium of the people”, Shariati 
poses the question ‘what religion is’ and brings a different perspective to the 
discussion. According to Shariati, when religion remains in the hands of the 
sovereign classes, it becomes exactly this crippling, dulling, and opiate religion 
(Akkoç, 2013, p. 372). The religion that is practiced today is a religion of shirk which 
has the aim to legitimize and eternalize the domination of a minority by a majority. 
This kind of religion masks its shirk with tevhid, and covers its deviation from true 
religion by pretending to piety (Özdoğan, 2010, p.33; p. 35). While it protects itself 
from association with the devil, what it defines as a major sin, Shariati explains that 
such a religion remains silent against the biggest sin, exploitation, and, moreover, 
reproduces this silence by relaxing the souls with alms (sadaka), zakat (zekat), fitra 
and donations (Sönmez, 2013a, p. 47). In Muslim societies today, the opium 
function of the religion is at the forefront and this situation is being concealed by 
the narcotic effect of charity and religion is experienced in a quite elitist and 
populist way (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 35). Therefore, the Islam today is not that of the 
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Prophet, but rather an Islam that is used as a tool of subordination at the hands of 
the exploitative classes and ulama (Özdoğan, 2010, p.35).  
 
Thus Shariati proposes a return to the true Islam. However, he does not refer to a 
return at the hands of the ulama, who had already become an integral part of the 
ruling party and represented an obstacle on public access to the true Islam; rather, 
he tells of a return that would be led by a progressive intelligentsia (Abrahamian, 
1982, p. 28). According to Shariati, in Third World countries, there is a need for a 
dual “interconnected” and “synchronous” revolution that would be led by 
intelligentsia: a national revolution that would destroy imperial domination while 
restructuring the country’s cultural heritage and national identity and a social 
revolution that would terminate exploitation, poverty and capitalism while 
modernizing the economy and forming a dynamic and classless society 
(Abrahamian, 1982, p. 26). In this regard, Shariati proposes that if Islamic rhetoric 
would be used to promote socialism, the latter could save society from the dead 
end of capitalism (Özdoğan, 2010, p. 35).  
 
Similar to Marx, Shariati also emphasizes the dual structure of religion and defines 
religion as a concept which may, on the one hand, enslave the individual by making 
her/him submissive but may teach the individual freedom and resistance on the 
other (Tekin, 2010, p.60; Özdoğan, 2010, p. 33). Shariati explains that we can 
understand God only if we bring him “down from the sky” to the earth. The more 
we humanize God, the more approachable God becomes. The image of God 
imposed by sovereigns is that of an abstract God, yet what we need is a God on the 
earth (Sönmez, 2013a, p. 45). Confining justice to the sky destroys the motivation to 
look for justice on the earth; this view thus indirectly serves as the opium function 
of religion (Sönmez, 2013a, p. 45). Only to the extent that the divine comes down 
from the sky and walks among us can we approach the truth (p. 48), because only a 
theology based in this life enable narratives of quest, hope and resistance among 
the people (Sönmez, 2013a, p. 47). 
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2.2.3. Mustafa Sibai 
In Mustafa Sibai’s5 understanding, there are contradictions between Islam and 
communism: Islam allows freedom of constructive competition, while communism 
destroys it; class conflict is condemned by Islam but is promoted by communism; 
and there are religious and moral values which can be considered as the main 
elements of Islam but have no place in communism (Enayat, 2009, p. 145). 
Nonetheless, Sibai also defends the compatibility between Islam and socialism and 
tries to refute the misconceptions that positioned Islam and socialism as alien 
concepts (p. 145). In his discussions he states that the real owner of things was God 
and even if God was the original and ultimate owner of everything, God had 
endowed all his worldly possessions to the disposal of human beings. Based on his 
understanding of the Quran, the author thus draws two conclusions: Man cannot 
possess anything in the material world and everybody has equal rights to make use 
of the good things of the earth. Here the critical point is being honest and working is 
the most effective means to create this honesty. In this context, honest working is 
the origin of having possessions and individual ownership is a social duty in Islam (p. 
146).   
 
In one prophetic tradition it was stated that “people are partners in three things: 
water, fire and pastures/grass,” while another tradition adds salt to this equation. 
Based on this argument Sibai asserts that these were the basic necessity at the time 
of Prophet, and in modern time we can reformulate this argument by replacing the 
water, fire and grass/salt with water supplies, electricity and the indispensable 
requirements of contemporary life respectively. Taking this argument a step 
further, Sibai claims that the Prophet’s sayings point to the communization of 
resources and materials in order to block the probability of monopolized 
exploitation of public needs by private hands (Enayat, 2009, p. 146)  
 
In his approach to property rights under Islamic law, Sibai establishes a relationship 
between waqf and nationalization. “Waqf consists of removing the object of an 
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endowment from the possession of its owner” and thus the belonging is not 
restricted to one single person, while usufruct rights to the property are given to 
those for whom the bequest is desired. Sibai defines this as nationalization. Hima, 
another concept in Islamic property law, means “to reserve a piece of land as a 
grazing ground for public use,” so by creating hima the needs of the poor will be 
assured. In this sense the fulfillment of the needs of the poorer classes have priority 
in the protection of the state (p. 147). From this point forth, Sibai asserts that the 
principle of land nationalization in cases of necessity is feasible. However, the 
conditions for this nationalization should be based on Islamic rules (p. 147).      
 
Sibai attributes a central role to the state and accepts state interference in the 
affairs of community based on his interpretation of the Quran (Enayat, 2009, p. 
147). For Sibai, the state is the tutelary protector. Sibai’s socialism, meanwhile, is a 
“spiritual socialism” [ruhçu sosyalizm] that put religion in the center and has a 
nationalist attitude (Özafşar, 2002, p. 151). This socialism is “spiritual” because it 
rejects the attitude of socialism that sees the human spirit [maneviyat] as 
unimportant. Socialism is politically reasonable since it adopts principles like social 
equality and freedom, but its spiritual (manevi) gap has to be filled. What would fill 
that spiritual gap is Islam. Thus the revolutions that socialism will realize in the 
economic field would be become complete with the spirit of Islam; in this way an 
understanding of socialism that appeals to everyone would be created (Akkoç, 
2013, p. 366).  
 
2.3. Is Left Compatible with Islam? The Main Axes of Discussion in Sol İlahiyat 
If we look at the relationship between the left and religion from a broad 
perspective, the general opinion on the left, with reference to the opiate aspect of 
religion, finds that socialist politics should stay out of religion (Durak, 2012, p. 84). 
Yet, as we know, the relationship is more complex than that. According to Utkucu 
(2013), religions emerged as instruments of revolt against the existing order and 
took a stand in favor of those who were oppressed in order to claim their rights. In 
 
5 Mustafa Sibai (1915-1964) is a Syrian political thinker, educator, writer, and founder of the Syrian 
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this context, religions actually had a “leftist” attitude during their emergence 
(Utkucu, 2013, p. 120). Later, however, they were internalized by the system and 
thus transformed into instruments of hegemony (Özdoğan, 2013, p. 105). 
Supporting this argument, Özdoğan (2013) explains that in the Islamic world, , 
religion was being used as an instrument of domination by sovereigns (Özdoğan, 
2013, p. 106). Even the verse “Mulk (possession/ownership) belongs to Allah [Mülk 
Allah’ındır]” was interpreted for the benefit of the sovereigns, and the words of the 
Prophet, as conveyed in explicit and certain hadith about non-possession, were 
ignored (Özdoğan, 2013, p. 111). The existing interpretation of Islam is dominated 
by property owners and related classes, and these classes tie Islam to ownership 
[mülkiyet], freedom and equality. 
 
If I elaborate on this interpretation, this approach to Islam prioritizes ownership as a 
divine element of the economic system but ignores the fact that the concept of 
ownership is an institution that produces servitude (Utkucu, 2013, p. 131). Utkucu 
bases this argument on the fact that there is no concept in Islam that represents the 
opposite of “ownership.” (p. 123), even though, as he explains, the Quran actually 
exhibits a “leftist” political attitude with regard to the oppressed. However, he 
continues, this attitude has been ignored by the clerics allied with the bourgeoisie 
(ownership class), and the Quran has been interpreted on behalf of this class 
(Utkucu, 2013, p. 131). This interpretation postpones a society without property, 
class, or exploitation—the ideal societal order—to heaven while opposing the 
emergence of such a system on earth (Utkucu, 2013, p. 134). 
 
Secondly, the combination of political authority, religion and property ownership 
opposes the concept of freedom; indeed, for Islam today, freedom is almost coded 
as a call to sin. Thirdly and lastly, this view pushes women towards a secondary 
position socially, politically and biologically. The ideal woman in this system remains 
inferior to and dependent on men; women who seek to go beyond this role are 
seen as problematic (Utkucu, 2013, p. 122).  
 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
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Utkucu continues his article by outlining three critiques put forth by Islamic thinkers 
against the concept of sol ilahiyat. The first criticism is the argument that there 
cannot be a theology in Islam, that theology is inherent in Christianity. The second 
criticism explains that the primary component of Islam is the faith in God; sol 
ilahiyat, according to these critics, reduces Islam to an ideology by ignoring this 
priority. In other words, if Islam were to become worldly through the 
implementation of a (leftist) political agenda, the function of the hereafter would be 
destroyed (p. 123). A third and final criticism is the argument that there is no 
alternative to property ownership available in Islam (Utkucu, 2013, p. 134).    
Hasan Hanefi (2009) broadens Utkucu’s formulation by pointing to a more general 
argument: that of the essential incompatibility of Islam and the left. Islam, in this 
view, is not something that can have a “right” or a “left.” Islam is a religion; it has 
fixed rules and certain conditions. Thus this perspective rejects the existence of 
plural Islamic variations; it rejects the idea that there can be different versions of 
Islam depending on time, place or class. To put it differently, this criticism, as 
indicated by Hanefi, does not accept the presentation of Islam by the Islamic left as 
a religion of the oppressed against the Islam of wealthy exploiters because Islam is a 
single, monolithic and constant concept (Hanefi, 2009, pp. 133-134).  
 
A second criticism of the Islamic left presented by Hanefi is the idea that an “Islamic 
left” is an oxymoron, something irrational like “fried ice”. A secular leftist cannot 
promote a religious order, while a rightist proponent of a religious order cannot be 
a secularist (p. 134). This reductionist approach asserts that the Islamic left is a 
movement that is atheist, communist, Marxist and one that emulates Liberation 
Theology (Hanefi, 2009, p. 135). An “Islamic left,” according to this criticism, is 
removed from the people. This is true whether the criticism comes from the 
political right (“the Islamic left is atheist and communist”) or from the political left 
(“the Islamic left is Islamist and reactionist”). Accordingly political efforts in this vein 
are said to be baseless, isolated, and unable to transcend being a minority 
movement (p. 136). A final criticism voiced against the Islamic left, meanwhile, 
positions it as a majority movement that has a hidden agenda rather than a 
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minority movement. According to this point of view, the Islamic left is a new form of 
political Islam, a moderate theoretical face to a conservative Islamic movement, or 
even a kind of “code word” for an Islamist movement that seeks only to attain 
political power (Hanefi, 2009, p. 136). 
 
Sönmez (2013b) brings a new point to this discussion and writes that the main 
criticism voiced from the right with regard to discussions of sol ilahiyat defines 
religion as a concept that exists exclusively in the terrain of rightist ideology, and 
that the right does not want to share it with anyone. In essence, such an approach is 
offended by what it sees as leftist interference in “their” religion and seeks to limit 
discussions on religion to its own circles. Sönmez argues that such “tacit fascism” 
limits the opportunity for discussion, deliberation and finding common ground 
(Sönmez, 2013b, p. 70). Agreeing with both Hanefi and Utkucu, Sönmez indicates 
that the right positions sol ilahiyat as an ideology with foreign origins that evolved 
out of Christianity. Finally, Sönmez argues, the right views sol ilahiyat and the use of 
religious references by the left as a means of attaining political power (p. 70). 
 
Next, there are liberal criticisms of the idea of sol ilahiyat. One opinion is that Islam 
cannot be thought of together with socialism, but that it can be combined with 
capitalism. For example, according to Mustafa Akyol, “Islam, a religion that ensures 
the rights to private property and inheritance, categorically encourages trade, and 
paves the way to a free market by refusing to cap prices, is extremely compatible 
with an ethical form of capitalism” (Akyol, 2006). While there is an Islam compatible 
with capitalism, sol ilahiyat is considered an unrealistic movement. 
 
Other observers of sol ilahiyat come from a completely different perspective. For 
them, sol ilahiyat is not an impossible utopia, but rather a possible starting point in 
the creation of a more equitable order. Burhan Sönmez (2013b) characterizes sol 
ilahiyat as an attempt to question both religion itself as well as the way we 
approach religion. The author attributes two characteristics to this discussion (p. 
69). First, religion is not a stable, constant fact. Religion is a dynamic concept that is 
lived and perceived differently everywhere in the world and in different individuals’ 
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everyday lives. Second, such observers focus on the deficiencies of the existing 
criticisms voiced against religion. Sönmez draws attention to the necessity of going 
beyond a critique of religion that is nothing more than a thinly-veiled hatred or 
humiliation of religion (Sönmez, 2013b, p. 69). The rigid mindset whose only stance 
toward religion is opposition against it should be overcome (p. 68). In this sense, the 
discussion on sol ilahiyat is not simply a call for unity between Islam and the left; it 
is an invitation to Islam and the left to look at themselves and the other again in an 
ongoing process of self-reflection and discussion (Sönmez, 2013b, p. 71).       
 
Another view considers sol ilahiyat as a movement that has revolutionary potential. 
According to this interpretation, religion includes a power that can serve as the 
foundation for demands for justice, freedom and equality. It has always had the 
potential to be the driving force of resistance of the oppressed and the poor 
(Özdoğan, 2013, p. 105). From this perspective, sol ilahiyat is not a utopian project, 
but rather a fully realizable movement an interpretation of class struggle that seeks 
to understand faith from the perspective of the oppressed (Utkucu, 2013, p. 136). 
Sol ilahiyat opposes the way that religion is propped up in the capitalist system and 
rejects the way that property owners and related groups present their class reason 
as if it were the dictates of Islam (p. 123). Sol ilahiyat does not defend this singular 
reason; rather, it defends freedom of expression, claiming that a notion of religion 
in which different ideas can coexist is also possible in Islam. In this regard, sol 
ilahiyat is a rebellion “against an Islam that turns labor into slavery, women into 
pariahs and thought into a prison” and instead “for an Islam of the oppressed” 
(Utkucu, 2013, p.123). Moreover, this is a quite legitimate and realistic uprising 
because it bases itself not only on the Quran and the precepts of spiritual life but 
also as a response to the oppression and exploitation that exist in this life (p.129). 
According to this view, the existing perception of Islam cannot contribute to the 
solution of existing problems. Capitalism is able to generate considerable legitimacy 
for itself through the way it presents Islam. As argued by these scholars, the Islam of 
the oppressed must be constituted against the Islam of the oppressors, and the left 
and Islam can come side by side (p. 129).   
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Polat Alpman (2012), meanwhile, remains skeptical about the prospects of a sol 
ilahiyat from a leftist perspective. Alpman agrees that there are some points in 
Islamism and the left that might see eye to eye, but that these points are limited 
and have difficulty going beyond the recognition that “what the left argues is 
already in Islam anyway” (Alpman, 2012, p. 95). Moreover, he argues that a 
transcendent political language (one based on religion) cannot be established 
between Islam and the left, because even if a leftist politics that internalizes Islam 
could be constructed, it would still have to contend with opposition or counter-
arguments that claim to be more Islamic. Accordingly, he argues that the 
rapprochement between Islamic theology and the left cannot go beyond the 
romanticism seen in the typology of the “communist imam” or create concrete 
room for action. In this regard, in his discussion of sol ilahiyat, Alpman considers the 
left not as a subject or an actor but as a vector, one that always points to the left of 
theology (Alpman, 2012, p. 99). According to this formulation, the union of the left 
and theology can only be materialized via the experiences of the oppressed. The 
encounters, coalescences and contacts that are produced by these experiences 
would create a meeting ground, even if a challenging one, for the left and Islam 
(Alpman, 2012, p. 100). 
 
According to Dilek Zaptçıoğlu (2009) the revolutionary-transformative potential of 
belief involves a dynamism that emerges only to the extent we relocate belief to 
this world from the hereafter. Otherwise, belief cannot go beyond being a notion 
bounded to the afterlife, one that remains distant from real life in society 
(Zaptçıoğlu, 2009, p. 57). This is why, in a similar vein to Alpman, Zaptçıoğlu 
recommends looking at the world from the point of view of the poor and 
oppressed, (by going beyond the anti-west, anti-American and anti-Soviet rhetoric) 
and presents this as the common possibility for both the left and Islam to develop in 
a positive way (Zaptçıoğlu, 2009, p.59). 
 
Similar to Alpman, Derviş Aydın Akkoç (2013) is also in search of a common ground 
on which both Islam and the left can stand. According to Akkoç’s formulation, Islam 
has been “defeated” by capitalism and thus shares the same destiny as socialism. 
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Therefore he draws attention to the common “ground of traumatic defeat” as the 
area on which both socialism and Islam can stand (p. 376). Akkoç argues that Islam 
and the left should focus their discourse on this ground because otherwise the 
resulting conversation can only become one in which the terminology of both sides 
compete for hegemony over one another (p. 377). This is why Akkoç emphasizes 
the need for the construction of a consciousness and a language: a consciousness 
that is aware that Islam and socialism are speaking to different worlds, and a 
language that based on plurality. By the help of this common plural language, 
everybody could use their own words, and this language has the potential to create 
political freedom. As a result, Akkoç argues that viewing “jihad and class struggle, 
revolution and revelation, classless society and heaven, the downtrodden 
[mostazhafin] and the proletariat” as equivalent bears considerable risks; rather, 
such concepts could be used as an “interface” that can ensure a political alliance 
between Islam and socialism (Akkoç, 2013, pp. 376-377).  
 
Against the idea of gathering on “the common ground of traumatic defeat”, as 
proposed by Akkoç, in the interview held by Salih Kutluer ,Ümit Aktaş argues that 
solidarity and common ground between Muslims and socialists can be established 
based on the struggle and practices of resistance against capitalism, globalization 
and injustice. On this point, however, Aktaş emphasizes that the concept of sol 
ilahiyat is a misnomer. According to Aktaş, ilahiyat (theology) is a problematic area 
for both left and Muslims. It is a concept that belongs to Christianity. Trying to 
establish the same rapport that exists between Christianity and the left in Turkey 
means “taking the easy way out” by following the Western examples (Aktaş, 2011)6. 
With a similar attitude, Dilaver Demirağ also finds the debate surrounding sol 
ilahiyat to be “reductionist” and claims that sol ilahiyat can only be a kind of 
“shuttle trade” from the understanding adapted by Liberation Theology in 
Christianity (Demirağ, 2011). Finally, Ahmet Örs considers the existing discussion on 
sol ilahiyat to be a valuable one, but also points to the problems posed by the word 
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“ilahiyat” and argues that those who wish to create a link between Islam and 
socialism should not establish one merely based on theory (theology) but, as Aktaş 
also argues, come together “in the field” and develop modes of resistance together 
with one another (Örs, 2011).   
 
2.4. The Relationship between Religion and Socialism in Turkey and New-
Muslimhood 
In his article “Aynı Trende İslam ve Sosyalizm” [Islam and Socialism in the Same 
Train], Utkucu (2010) indicates that the secular Republic of Turkey was, somewhat 
ironically, constructed on a Turkish, Muslim and Hanafi7 identity. In the construction 
of this identity, Islam was absorbed by Kemalism through means like the Friday 
khutbahs8 and unified with the ideological character of Kemalism. Islam took on the 
task of creating social harmony by being transformed into the religion of the state. 
In this mechanism, where religion was produced “in this world” and “for this world” 
with the aim of transforming life, society was defined as not being divided by class, 
an unprivileged mass that would benefit from Kemalism’s principle of populism. 
Ignoring socio-economic differences, such an ideology pretended as if human 
beings were equal in this world. According to Utkucu, this was one example of a 
local example of Marx’s argument that “religion is the opium of the people”. In this 
process, anti-communism was incorporated into Muslimhood via the official 
ideology; Islam and socialism became more distant from one another, and in the 
official ideology, these terms were defined as conflictual and incompatible with 
each other. In this way, while conscientious capitalism became the most leftist 
interpretation of religion, property relationships, economic, political and social 
relationships were embraced as unchangeable and should be accepted a “destiny” 
determined by God. As “destiny,” such relations became a concept that could not 
be resisted or opposed: rebellion against this “destiny” was counted as rebellion 
against God. As a consequence of all this, Muslims, the community of the state 
 
6 See this link to read the interviews of Ümit Aktaş, Dilaver Demirağ and Ahmet Örs : 
http://www.emekveadalet.org/alinti/teoriyle-mi-pratikle-mi-sol-ve-islam-nerede-bulusur-mustafa-
tekin-ahmet-ors-dilaver-demirag-kurtulus-kayali-mehmet-bekaroglu-ve-umit-aktas/  
7 One of the schools of Sunni Islam. 
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religion, became the natural constituency of rightist politics, who could draw or 
their belief, and moved away from the left (Utkucu, 2010, p.45). 
 
Utkucu goes on to argue, however, that this move away from the left cannot only 
be defined as a successful state project. The failure of the left and right in terms of 
understanding each other also certainly became a crucial factor driving this process. 
First of all, if we look at the prejudices of the left regarding the right, Utkucu argues 
that the mistake of the left is to label the just demands of religious people and 
Kurds as “reactionism” [gericilik] and to excuse the regime’s treatment of these 
groups (Utkucu, 2010, p. 48). Mustafa Tekin also reads the present antagonistic 
relationship in a similar way: In the history of Turkey the left excluded religion in 
general and Islam in particular from its analysis by labeling them as “reactionary”. 
Moreover, the left’s positioning of religion as an institution of the superstructure 
pushed religion to be the passive outcome of means and relations of production 
(Tekin, 2010, p. 61). 
 
Cihan Aktaş summarizes the mistake of the left against the religious segments of 
society as a state of being “separated from the people” [halktan kopukluk]. In this 
view, the left, who has taken upon itself the mission of “rescuing the people,” either 
does not know the people at all or came from the people but has since become 
alienated from it; in either case, it attempts to rescue the people while ignoring the 
people’s own needs and demands (Aktaş, 2010, p. 69). In a similar vein, in his article 
Alpman also defines the biggest criticism voiced against the left as its incapacity to 
appeal to religious people and their values in its political discourse and, accordingly, 
its inability to interpret such values in its own politics (Alpman, 2012, p. 93). At the 
same time, Alpman argues that the approach of the left to religion—that is, its 
understanding of religion as a historical and social phenomenon—was interpreted 
on the right as if the left had a political project against religion and religious people. 
By extension, taking part on the left was seen as a sign of having a snobbish and 
snide attitude that degraded the people (Alpman, 2012, p. 93), transforming the 
 
8 A khutba is a longer prayer or sermon given by an Imam during the Friday prayer or on holy days. 
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right, as underlined by Aktaş, into a political category that the religious masses felt 
more comfortable in (Aktaş, 2010, p. 73).      
 
Meanwhile, what happened on the left, according to Ümit Aktaş, was that socialism 
in Turkey limited itself to a Marxist-Leninist-Kemalist interpretation (Aktaş, 2009, p. 
22). Since socialism could not—or preferred not—to put an end to its relationship 
with Kemalism, the anti-Westernist right remained as the sole ground to criticize 
Kemalism, which was seen as Occidental in essence. In this regard, while Ümit Aktaş 
defines Alevis as the primary mass to which Marxist-socialist movements could 
appeal (Aktaş, 2009, p. 21), Cihan Aktaş argues that the right is a political category 
in which religious Sunni segments of society felt more comfortable (Aktaş, 2010, p. 
73).  
Furthermore, strengthening this supposed incompatibility between the left and 
religion in Turkey, the harmony between the right and religion was reinforced in 
various discourses and linguistic metaphors. For example, as Tekin points out, a 
number of religious traditions—the belief that good deeds should be performed 
with the right hand, the belief that one should cross a good threshold with the right 
foot (Tekin, 2010, p. 61), the belief that those who deserve entry into heaven are 
written on the right-hand page of the book of judgment [amel defteri] and those 
who deserve hell are on the left—are interpreted metaphorically as “right” and 
“left” in politics as well, and a sign of the Islamic legitimacy of the “right” (Tekin, 
2010, p. 62).  
 
However it would be unfair to say that there have been no attempts to create a 
positive relationship between religion and the left or that Islam and socialism were 
never considered together in Turkish history. The scholar Nurettin Topçu and the 
socialist politician Hikmet Kıvılcımlı can be seen as two representatives of this effort. 
For example, by discarding the widely held view among socialists that religion was 
always reactionary, Kıvılcımlı points out that religion develops different 
characteristics depending on the time and place (Ağcabay, 2009, p. 95; Sönmez, 
2013b, p.65). In this context, the speech he gave in Eyüp in 1957 is significant. 
Referring to the Quranic verse that “man can have nothing except that for which he 
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labors”9 Kıvılcımlı underlined the importance of labor in Islam. While the laws and 
norms of the order that existed until Muhammad were still God’s law, Kıvılcımlı 
argued, it was Muhammad who was the last of the prophets and offered an 
“ultimate truth” to humanity (Kavuş, 2009, p. 124). This truth was that humanity 
must now take control of their own destiny (Sönmez, 2013b, p. 55). Henceforth, 
people had to make laws on their own. According to Kıvılcımlı, in order to do this, 
mosques emerged as the biggest meeting place for people (Kavuş, 2009, p. 124). 
Kıvılcımlı’s socialist interpretation of religion, however, cost him dearly: After his 
speech in Eyüp, Kıvılcımlı was arrested for spreading communist propaganda via 
religion and sent to prison (Ağcabay, 2009, p. 103). 
Another person who sought to combine socialism and Islam is Nurettin Topçu. 
Topçu defended a genuine mixture of Anatolian nationalism and socialism as the 
ideal state and social order (as cited in Perşembe, 2002, p. 94). In this system, which 
he named “Muslim Anatolian Socialism” [Müslüman Anadolu Sosyalizmi] Topçu 
created a synthesis based on Islam, Anatolian Turkism and socialism (Turgut, 2009, 
p. 200). Topçu depicts capitalism, feudalism [ağalık düzeni], imposter clerics, Jews, 
masons, communism, so-called intellectuals and the media that supports these 
intellectuals as the primary forces that stand in the way of the implementation of a 
socialist system (Aktaş, 2009, p. 42). Similarly, Topçu rejects modernization, 
considering it a “scourge that must be eliminated” (alt edilmesi gereken bir musibet) 
(Bora, 2009, p. 90). He argues that people should cast aside their Westernism, their 
obsession with foreign things, their false understandings of religion and nationalism 
(Turgut, 2009, p. 200). In this sense, he writes that a society like Turkey’s, which is 
besieged and awaits its rescue, can ride out of the storm with a “spiritual, statist 
and authoritative form of socialism” [ruhçu, devletçi, otorite sahibi bir sosyalizm] (as 
cited in Perşembe, 2002, p. 95). This socialism is spiritual because in Topçu’s mind, 
moral considerations have an undisputable position over social problems 
(Perşembe, 2002, p. 98). Accordingly, this spiritual socialism is to take its main 
principles from Islam (Perşembe, 2002, p. 99).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Surah An-Najm, Verse 39  
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Nevertheless, neither Kıvılcımlı’s pragmatic synthesis nor Topçu’s nationalist and 
occasionally even fascist synthesis found much resonance either on the political left 
or right. The ideology of the political right, too, impedes a functional synthesis of 
socialism and Islam. Like the left, the right has difficulties in understanding and 
analyzing the left and considers people on the left to be biased. Firstly, those on the 
right equated the left with the CHP [Republican People’s Party] on the national scale 
and with the Soviet Union on the international scale (Tekin, 2010, p. 62). From this 
perspective, in which the primary condition of being Muslim was reduced to being 
anti-communist. For Islamists, the left usually corresponded to a higher level of 
modernism that sought to eliminate religion. In this view, socialists were 
transformed into the most cruel and non-conciliatory representatives of modernism 
and the socialist struggle was transformed into a mythological narrative that stoked 
the fears of Islamists. Consequently, in response to the modernism offered by 
socialists, people on the right relied upon the ideologies that gave credible promises 
that no one would touch their religion and tradition (Alpman, 2012, p. 94; Özdoğan, 
2013, p. 113; Tuğal, 2002, p. 69). Ömer Laçiner (2013) writes that prejudices against 
the socialists’ view of humanity and their emphasis on the boundlessness of 
developments in science and the mind was even branded among pious circles as an 
identity based on apostasy (shirk) (Laçiner, 2013, pp. 86-87).  
 
At the same time, in an interview, Laçiner (2002) emphasizes that there is an elitist 
and authoritarian political line in Turkey that also qualifies as being on the “left”. 
The CHP, which identifies itself as center-left, has allied with those who identify 
themselves as being even further to the left. According to Laçiner, there are many 
among this alliance who entertain the idea of using military force to overthrow the 
administration, who lambaste religion as “reactionism” and who have taken on a 
mission of “enlightening” society (Laçiner, 2002, pp. 158-169). Yasin Aktay (2002) 
formulates this idea in another way: For those on the political right, “when you say 
the word ‘left,’ what comes to mind is ‘enlightenmentism’, positivism, Kemalism, 
orientalism and atheism on an ideological level and despotism, militarism, and a 
culture of (or actual attempts at) military coups at the political level” (Aktay, 2002, 
p. 50).  
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As a result of these conceptualizations and positioning, the right has stood aloof 
from the left. It would be incorrect to argue, however, that the right has kept its 
distance from capitalism. Some religious groups have successfully incorporated 
themselves into the capitalist system. Starting in the 1980s, Islamist groups started 
to become urbanized and to gain class characteristics along with the changing 
social, political and economic atmosphere after the coup and the introduction of 
economic liberalism. In this process, a life style which gave a religious tinge to 
earthliness, hedonism and conformism religious emerged. A religious bourgeoisie 
coalesced as a community of people who reproduced capitalism via their 
consumption patterns, habits and lifestyles. For these Muslims, while the modest, 
sharing, simple and fair life of the Prophet Muhammad was a reference point in 
theory, in practice there was a transition to an order where capitalist ideas and 
activities could be reproduced with Islamic labels (Tekin, 2010, p. 63). According to 
Tekin, this transition represented the emergence of a “Muslim capitalism” in which 
individuals were fixated on the details of ritual but nevertheless ignored “real-
world” issues like poverty and remained uninterested in the problems facing the 
world and humanity (Tekin, 2010, p.65).  
 
Dilek Zaptçıoğlu (2009) theorizes this transition in another interesting way. In her 
artice Zaptçıoğlu discusses the process by which religion is relegated to being a 
matter for the afterlife [dinin uhrevileştirilmesi] and problematizes the role of 
capitalism in this process. According to this conceptualization, by making faith into a 
matter for the afterlife, capitalism distances religion from our lives, limits it, and 
makes it more conservative or rightist (Zaptçıoğlu, 2009, p. 57). In other words, 
while religion becomes a concept of the next world, individuals are abandoned to 
predestinarianism; the interest of God in humans and society has ended (Tekin, 
2010, p. 65). Mustafa Tekin goes as far as to call this a de facto atheism: the 
individual consults God only for the problems that s/he cannot vanquish, while God 
has lost the role of being the guiding spirit in comprehending the existential reality 
(Tekin, 2010, p. 65). 
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In this way, a hybrid version of Islam emerged that delayed the resolution of all 
worldly problems to the afterlife, took pleasure out of the worldly (and even made 
this satisfaction a central facet of its own legitimacy), postponed the establishment 
of a just order to the afterlife, and made room only for believers who also believed 
in capitalism. There are those, however, who believe that such an understanding of 
religion—one that carries little regard for justice and which speaks with the 
language of capital—is the voice of the oppressor; they believe that any religious 
discourse which does not take equality as its basis falls on deaf ears and only 
concerns the market (Sönmez, 2013b, p. 56). This understanding of Islam which 
contradicted itself by excluding the terms of equality and justice, created a crisis of 
political identity for a significant portion of Islamists. However, this was not a 
unidirectional identity crisis; socialists who were defeated by capitalism, too, 
questioned their own political position and stance, and opened up their political 
identity for discussion. In this way, groups that sought to go beyond the state 
emerged on all sides of the existing political context (Alpman, 2012, p. 92), finding 
hybrids of left and right, capitalist and religious, and socialist and pragmatist. 
 
Today, those in power seek to use the potential of religion, and, as Yasin Durak 
(2012) argues, religion constitutes the main reference point for public demands and 
political legitimization. As a result, writes Durak, from today’s perspective, it will be 
impossible for any new political action or movement to avoid inclining toward 
religion. New ways of questioning identity, combined with the popularity of political 
Islam, have caused the emergence of new ideological orientations both from the 
right to left and the left to right. In other words, “the production of an oppositional 
and egalitarian discourse from within religious circles that emulates socialism 
emerged at the same time as a new orientation within the left that did not 
demonize religion.” This approach, which can be defined as “leftist theology” [sol 
ilahiyat] represents new ground for understanding and thinking about politics and 
society in Turkey. “Leftist theology” presents a fertile ground for discussion because 
it emphasizes the ideas that Islam cannot be used as a mechanism of achieving 
political power and argues that the way Islam is lived today does not correspond to 
its original calling (Durak, 2012, p. 85).  
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has prepared the framework for a deeper discussion of Emek Adalet 
Platformu’s position in the Turkish public sphere and in the broader intellectual 
world of Islamism and leftism. Like Liberation Theology, a religious movement in 
Christianity that used Marxist concepts, various figures (including Taha, Shariati and 
Sibai) have historically sought to combine Islam and socialism in different ways. 
However, “leftist theology” or “sol ilahiyat” in Islam has received criticism from 
groups both on the left and the right. Despite these discussions, the left and Islam 
do have a number of shared characteristics which offer some room for 
convergence. As I demonstrate in the last section, however, other ideologies of 
Islam and economics have come to dominate the Turkish public sphere. In the last 
several decades, Turkey has seen the emergence of a “Muslim capitalism”, an 
ideology or way of life that integrates an emerging Muslim bourgeoisie into a 
capitalist framework. This situation created an identity crisis for Islamists and 
socialists, both of whom had failed in the mid-twentieth century to provide a 
successful alternative system to capitalism. Groups and individuals who find 
themselves within the framework of sol ilahiyat in Turkey thus face significant 
intellectual and structural obstacles to their work 
 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu is one of the movements that practices struggle and 
resistance on this discussion ground. This movement, which criticizes capitalism and 
existing government with references to the Quran but simultaneously embraces 
socialist values with an emphasis on labor, equality, justice and a life without 
exploitation, is a concrete example of how discussions on “sol ilahiyat” have taken 
shape in Turkey. In the upcoming third chapter, I will examine how and by whom 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu took shape with the help of the interviews I conducted 
with its members. The next chapter will thus serve as an “identity analysis” for the 
movement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHO AND WHAT IS EMEK VE ADALET PLATFORMU? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the basic characteristics of Emek ve Adalet Platformu 
and seek to create a kind of “identity card” for the movement. I will look at the 
various stages of development that the platform went through, show how it acted 
in the public sphere and examine the main principles which the platform has 
adopted. The main themes include the emergence of the platform, its decision-
making processes, the organization of the platform, the profiles of its participants, 
the political stance taken by the platform and others. The sources I have used to 
examine these issues include both the answers given by my respondents and the 
website of Emek ve Adalet Platformu, which helps fill possible gaps in the 
responses. In order to make my arguments and discussions in the next chapter 
meaningful it is very important to clearly present the identity of the platform. This is 
why in this chapter I aim to introduce Emek ve Adalet Platformu in a comprehensive 
way. I interviewed six people (2 female, 4 male) and personally followed their 
participation in platform meetings over the course of seven months from December 
2013 to July 2014. In this chapter (as well as throughout this thesis) I have used 
nicknames for my respondents to respect their request of privacy.    
 
3.2. Emek ve Adalet Platformu: An Identity Card for the Movement 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu is a movement that emerged in 2011 with the leadership 
of a core team of four people10. These four individuals’ readings and discussions had 
introduced them to names like Zeki Kılıçaslan, İhsan Eliaçık and Mehmet 
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 One of these four original members was my respondent Fatma, and another was her husband 
Salih. The other two founding members were abroad during my thesis research, which prevented me 
from contacting them. Fatma’s husband Salih declined a request for an interview, claiming that he 
did not represent the profile of the movement. Spefically, he said that, as an Alevi Kurd, he was an 
exception from the perspective of the platform. In the later chapters I will examine this issue more 
closely. With regard to political leanings of the founding members, my respondent Fatma said they 
were all had leftist tendencies. 
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Bekaroğlu11. As a result of the relationships established with such individuals, 
“people who have baggage from the Muslim neighborhood12” (as my respondent 
Fatma called them) began to be included in their lives alongside their usual leftist 
circles. As a result, the idea of “struggling together” began to emerge. Fatma, who 
witnessed the founding period, explains the situation as follows:  
 
The four of us were already active in a particular anarchist circle in Istanbul. 
We even put out a magazine for a year called Mülksüzler (The Dispossessed). 
When the four of us, and a few of our friends, then began reading about 
ideas like “the local” [yerellik], “being Muslim”, “Islam”, and so on, we were 
able to meet İhsan Eliaçık. As we continued our readings on the local, we 
came across the name Zeki Kılıçaslan and were able to meet him, too. And 
we already [were aware of] Mehmet Bekaroğlu since the early 2000s 
because of his journal Doğudan (From the East). We would always look at 
Doğudan to see what he was saying. And at the other writers in Doğudan, 
like Hayri Kırbaşoğlu and people like İlhami Güler. Afterwards, the contact 
we had made with Zeki Kılıçaslan turned into something more like 
friendship. And of course, the more we got to know these circles, the more 
we started to meet people in different circles, especially people like İhsan 
Eliaçık. We became friends, for example, with Islamists from the Milli Görüş 
(National Opinion) movement. We began to meet the people who showed 
up at İhsan Eliaçık’s office. And people who were carrying baggage from the 
Muslim neighborhoods outside of our own leftist circles began to enter our 
lives. 
 
As can be understood from the words of Fatma, people like Zeki Kılıçaslan, Mehmet 
Bekaroğlu, and İhsan Eliaçık emerged as encouraging figures in the foundation of 
the movement. The way Tarık described them, such individuals were “the people 
who said what Emek ve Adalet Platformu tried to say and so they were the people 
who inspired and were read by the members of Emek ve Adalet Platformu.” As 
such, these names have an important role in the establishment and development of 
the movement.    
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 İhsan Eliaçık is a leftist-Islamist thinker. Zeki Kılıçaslan and Mehmet Bekaroğlu are two important 
figures who took part in the establishment of the Has Parti (Halkın Sesi Partisi, Voice of the People 
Party). Though Bekaroğlu's political career made its way through the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), 
Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) and Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) (all parties that emphasized their 
religious leanings), today he is a member of parliament for the Republican People's Party (CHP). 
Kılıçaslan is a member of the CHP's party congress.  
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If we look at the atmosphere in which the Emek ve Adalet Platformu arose, Ayşe, an 
activist in her mid-20s refers to the Has Party13 experience. At the same time, Ayşe 
underlined the independence of the movement from Has Party as follows: 
 
I think the [developments] that I observed were affected a bit by what 
happened with the Has Party. Sure, in the end everyone [refers to my 
interviewees in Emek ve Adalet Platformu] might have said something 
different, but in the end there were people like Numan Kurtulmuş and Zeki 
Kılıçaslan. And they all founded a party. Actually, when I talked to Ayhan and 
other people, we weren’t initially talking about Emek Adalet, but our 
conversations always revolved around the Has Party: ‘Look at what our 
friends are doing. Is cooperation feasible? How might that work? After all, 
they [also] are concerned with social justice. Of course, Emek Adalet is 
separate from the Has Party. I mean, certain people would participate in 
both groups. But there were people in the Has Party who had never heard of 
Emek Adalet, and people in Emek Adalet who had nothing to do with the Has 
Party. For a while, [we] even held [our] meetings at the Has Party’s district 
office in Fatih. But then people said we had no business there, because in 
the end, they were a political party, and this was a platform, and so on. That 
was why we looked for another meeting place. 
 
Similar to Ayşe, my other interviewee Barış described the environment surrounding 
the founding of Emek Adalet Platformu by referring to the Has Party, and spoke of a 
Turkey where there were contacts between social justice movements and Islam and 
where the social visibility of the figures who expressed this contact increased. He 
explains that the discussions and criticisms started in this environment instilled 
hope among activists and locates Emek ve Adalet Platformu as a concrete reflection 
of this hope. Tarık, too, points to Emek ve Adalet Platformu as a meeting point at a 
conjuncture where it became more obvious that “people who both had leftist 
 
12 My interviewees used the word “neighborhood” to define the Muslim community they are 
interacted with. I will be using the same metaphor in this and the next chapter.   
13 The Has Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi-The Voice of the People Party) was founded in 2010. In 2012 the 
party was dissolved by the majority of the votes of its members and integrated into the AK Party, the 
ruling party in Turkey since 2002.  It had emerged in opposition to the AK Party but was later 
absorbed by it. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, one of the founders of the party, has described the establishment 
aim of the party as follows: “taking a lesson from the degeneration of religion in the public sphere by 
freeing it from the hands of those who transformed it into a political instrument, taking the ‘religion 
card’ from the hands of those groups responsible for this, and bridging the distance between leftist, 
socialist groups and Islam, which the former identifies with the right-wing, conservatives and even 
pro-Americanism’ (http://t24.com.tr/haber/ilahiyat-profesoru-kirbasoglu-hem-akp-hem-gulen-
kanadiyla-dini-bu-kadar-hoyratca-kullanan-bir-siyasi-hareket-gelmedi,360703). 
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tendencies and were Muslim felt the need to come together”. In a similar vein, 
Mehmet speaks of a Turkey in which Islam and the left already have a lot of practice 
coming together on anti-imperialism, but also one in which classic Islamism has 
spent all of its built-up social and political capital and in which the AK Party has 
established its own hegemony. In this manner, he says that while a real pursuit of 
an Islamic word and discourse regarding labor and capitalism was starting, an 
aspiration for a new politics emerged. He presents Emek ve Adalet Platformu as a 
space that emerged in response to such aspirations.  
 
Like Ayşe and Barış, Ali also showed how the movement emerged simultaneously 
with the Has Party. Although the movement was independent from the party, Ali 
explains, there was proximity between the platform and the Has Party due to the 
personal relationships with the figures like Zeki Kılıçaslan, who were prominent 
party members. He indicates that he had been looking for ways to argue against 
finance capitalism and, in this pursuit, he had discussions with people who shared 
his views, but developed their arguments within a framework Muslimhood. This 
was a time in which “people on the margins who were sensitive to certain issues 
and who wanted to partner and collaborate on various points” got together. In Ali’s 
words, the Emek ve Adalet Platformu emerged in Turkey at a time when “a political 
gap came about with the abolishment of military tutelage”. 
 
This moment of emergence was, for Barış, the mobilization of a group by a certain 
feeling: “[…] seeing that there are people who think similarly, that there is 
dynamism in the circle of friends they are in, then there is a will to make this 
dynamism into something more tangible, so let’s hold a meeting, let’s do 
something, let’s create a text that reflects our principles, let’s create a movement”. 
A few preliminary meetings were held in December 2010 to gather circles that dealt 
with similar issues, and the platform itself was established in January 2011. Here, 
the platform’s mission statement and declaration of principles were written, a mail 
group was constituted and it was decided to meet up every two weeks. Initially the 
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meetings were held in cafes, but the platform moved into its own office in 
Fatih/Kıztaşı in October 2011 and has held meetings there since then14.    
If we look at the structure and functioning of the movement, we can examine how 
individuals become members and how the movement organizes leadership. The 
movement employs a monthly donation and contribution [aidat] system. Since 
there are no other sources of income other than such contributions, members 
support the movement to the extent allowed by their budget and desire15. All 
decisions are taken during routine meetings held once every two weeks at the 
movement’s office in Fatih/Kıztaşı. Mehmet says that the movement acts according 
to the principle of transparency, adopting the tradition of the open meeting. Being a 
member of other organizations does not pose an obstacle to joining the Emek ve 
Adalet Platformu; that is, the movement displays an attitude that embraces 
different political experiences rather than discriminating or rejecting them. The 
movement does not have a chairperson or leader; members attempt to reach 
agreement through common discourse. The necessary tasks of the movement are 
carried out based on the responsibility-voluntarism principle. The movement adopts 
a horizontal organizational structure, and my respondents frequently emphasized 
non-hierarchicalism. In this regard, camaraderie [yoldaşlık] and solidarity have an 
important place in the movement (Mehmet). As a consequence of the existing 
structure in the platform, Tarık defines the decision-making processes as follows: 
 
[…] we really try and make a point of having everyone’s voice reflected in 
[our movement’s] decisions. There is no hierarchy. Any decisions taken at 
our meeting come about through us trying to convince each other, through 
the creation of a synthesis or a middle ground. For this reason, most 
decisions take a long time, that is, discussions can drag on. 
 
Ayşe, agreeing with Tarık that decisions take a long time to reach, accepts that long 
discussions might result in a degree of unproductivity but also emphasizes that this 
attitude is necessary in order to express words that can remain permanent and to 
make the right decisions: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 http://www.emekveadalet.org/biz-kimiz/ 
15 ibid. 
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Because there’s a general attitude that one shouldn’t do anything before 
discussing it fully, Emel Adalet naturally displays some inertia, but on the 
other hand, after all, if we intend to say something valuable over the long 
term, then this attitude is better than saying something in the heat of the 
moment that we might regret later. 
 
The structure of Emek ve Adalet Platformu is also influenced by the organizational 
background of its founding members. When we analyze the movement in terms of 
the founding cadre, Mehmet points out that Emek ve Adalet Platformu consists of 
two main components: those coming from an anarcho-sendicalist tradition and 
Islamists. While its founding was motivated by an impulse coming from the left, 
over time, the platform began to develop relationships, as Fatma explains, to 
people with experience mobilizing in Islamist circles, with closer relations to Sunni 
Turkish society and with a greater capacity to envision political possibilities there. 
Accordingly, there was a hybrid structure in the platform when it began, even if this 
structure was unable to survive in the long run. In this regard Tarık defines this 
short-term hybrid environment by implying that it was relatively chaotic: “In those 
days [the movement’s] structure included a lot of Marxists and the way it was 
developing was unclear. It was a little bit as if everyone was saying something 
different all at the same time.”  
 
As I stated previously, however, this hybrid structure resolved over time, evolving 
into a more homogeneous formation. The relationships that movement’s members 
had with the socialists—themselves by then a quite limited group within the 
movement—led to a stalemate, and some socialists did decide to part ways from 
the movement. Two key discussions led to impasses between the socialists in the 
movement and others: first, discussions surrounding the killing of Alevis in Sivas on 
2 July 1993, and second, discussions surrounding the renewed violence between 
Kurdish groups and the Turkish state after 2011. Mehmet claims that the movement 
did not draw its inspiration from the left and that any coordination with the left was 
never anything more than superficial.  
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Barış defines the founding cadre as people who have problems with the present 
political practices and order and who problematize these with a similar critical 
discourse. Barış depicts this group, meeting on their common ground, as follows:  
We came together on the basis of a particular criticism of the leftist and 
Islamic traditions. Several people came from the left, while several people 
came from the Islamic tradition. Everyone came together carrying criticism 
of his or her own ‘neighborhood’ [mahalle/circle]. […] so the platform was 
established by people who knew each other, who had shared ways of 
socialization, who understood each others’ concerns, who came from 
specific places which they criticized and who found each other over time in 
one way or another through such criticism. 
 
If we analyze the platform in terms of the participants, a Muslim middle-class 
background predominates among members. Ayşe’s categorization of participants, 
however, demonstrates that a class-based analysis of membership differs 
depending on the period in question:  
 
There are groups that are from our generation, who studied at the university 
and might be from the upper middle class, but there is also a group we 
might characterize as lower-middle [class]. This changes from period to 
period, too. Sometimes, when working-class women or men come to our 
meetings, the profile changes. I wouldn’t be able to pinpoint a specific 
profile for Emek Adalet. Well, maybe it’s because it is mostly made up of 
students, but looking at the profile, I might say it’s more middle class. 
 
Tarık defines the makeup of the movement as “a network in which students 
predominate but which also includes workers and civil servants and people who 
strive to establish relationships with workers.” 
 
Fatma, meanwhile, disagrees with Tarık’s claim that the movement includes 
workers. Arguing that this represents a drawback of the movement, she said:  
 
As an organization full of higher-education experience, maybe this is 
something unavoidable. There are no workers among us. Or rather, I guess, 
there are no people with a high-school or middle-school diploma. We joke 
about this a lot among our friends. We don’t have any elementary-school 
graduates, no children of workers, or people like that. There aren’t any 
children of poor families. I’m the most you get, and Salih (her husband) too, 
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as the son of workers. […] It’s middle-class. But then there aren’t children of 
rich families, either. 
 
Agreeing with Fatma, Barış also says that the participants in the movement differ in 
many aspects, but he also explains that they are generally homogeneous in terms of 
education level: “There are married people, single people, young people and 
students. Having mentioned students, I should say that we are more or less 
weighted toward people with higher education”. With similar intent, Ali also argues 
that the movement consists of “generally homogenous people who came together 
because they shared perspectives on many points,” but that the group still 
demonstrated its diversity in other ways. Asked whether it was an Islamic identity 
that made the group homogeneous, Ali replied that it did not have such a criterion, 
but they meet on common ground of “populism” [halkçılık] and non-
hierarchicalism.  
 
If I elaborate on the cadre that constitutes Emek ve Adalet Platformu, we can define 
a nucleus cadre made up of 8-10 people who are more prone to taking 
responsibility and accordingly who work more actively and intensely. Beyond the 
nucleus, there is a central committee of 30-35 people as well as a larger mass of 
sympathizers which participates in and supports the group’s activities or just offers 
passive consent. The movement’s ability to mobilize differs according to the context 
of the actions. For example, Barış states that the participation was higher “when 
they said words that had the potential to be popular.” On the other hand, he says, it 
is the nucleus cadre that takes the active role in actions regarding the unjust 
treatment toward minority groups.    
 
The age of the members of the platform ranges from 25-35. Barış hesitates to 
define this interval as a young one, therefore he defines the participant profile as 
one that can be considered “young as a normal mass movement but old in 
comparison to youth movements”. Fatma elaborates on this definition and 
describes the age distribution in Emek ve Adalet Platformu as follows: “There’s a 
group of people who have just graduated from university. There are fewer people in 
my age group (born in 1979). Much, much fewer. There are one or two people from 
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an older group—exactly two, actually. Therefore the age category is generally 
younger”.  
 
Labor and capitalism are two central issues in the agenda of Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu. In this regard, there are several instances of cooperation in which the 
movement organized in direct coordination with workers’ groups in order to 
support their union-based struggle to achieve rights. My respondents, however, 
underline that they do not establish this relationship in a hierarchical way or with an 
intent to “enlighten” workers. Mehmet expresses this situation as follows:  
 
[We seek to mobilize] without speaking on behalf of workers, but rather by 
learning from workers and being not the ‘bones’ of their mobilization, but 
the ‘calcium.’ […] We try to do things without being visible but still being by 
their side. […] Of course, we have to use a language that people understand. 
But I’m not talking about a hierarchical relationship between the language 
that we use versus theirs. […] Hey, if you’re going to speak to workers, you 
have to learn how to speak with them comfortably on a daily basis [selam 
alıp vermeyi], the way they do. It’s that simple. Whatever those workers are 
doing, however they live, that’s how you have to live, if your goal is really to 
work together with them, not ‘for’ them or ‘on their behalf.’ Get rid of that 
‘behalf’ and ‘for.’ They don’t exist. […] The best-case scenario would be for 
you not to [have to] be there at all. They are going to do it, act on their own. 
You are going to hand over the means you gathered as a capital and then 
you’re going to step aside.  
 
Ali describes this stance touched upon by Mehmet as the principle of “not speaking 
on behalf of anyone and not creating a discourse that puts yourself in the center”. 
Here, Ali includes the principle of “populism” [halkçılık]:  
 
The issue of populism. I tried to use the issue of populism to explain 
something earlier. And I said the people should be our teachers, right? In the 
struggle of the oppressed versus the oppressors, certain people are always 
trying to say something, calling people to action. For me, the basic function 
of calling others to action is to serve as a guarantor for the oppressed, who 
are struggling to achieve the rights and justice that actually belong to them, 
until they achieve what they set out to do. There is no other reason to do so. 
Some people seek to take over [the struggle], to claim it as their own 
‘property’. But [to those people I say,] ‘You’re nobody. At most you’re the 
person speaking the loudest’.  
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Even though Tarık rejects equating what Ali says with the term “populism”, his 
explanation of the movement and its work ethic still follows in harmony with Ali’s 
discourse:  
Even though all of us would agree with the emphasis on not being elitist, we 
think that we aren’t so easily categorized using concepts like populism, 
societalism or socialism. It’s not like we have the idea that, hey, those guys 
are praying on Fridays, so we have to pray, too. Or that we have to be closer 
to the values of the people or have to talk about them. Rather, we consider 
ourselves to have emerged from that kind of community, or more precisely, 
we try to operate without having to address a separate category of people 
we call ‘the people’ [halk]. 
 
In this sense, in Tarık’s words Emek ve Adalet Platformu attempts to pursue a 
“politics that rests on the subjecthood of the oppressed”. In Turkey, Barış 
elaborates, “those who are truly oppressed by the political system have no voice. 
Those movements that seek to be the voice of the oppressed end up either having 
to accommodate [the system] or fail to establish actual communication with the 
oppressed”. Ali, meanwhile, laments that oppressed members of society who 
should be seen as subjects are often put into the position of objects of political 
action:  
 
It’s very simple. That which comes from below always trumps that which 
comes from above. Two times two is four. A worker is aware of much more 
than the union boss trying to mobilize him or her, or the guy trying to give 
him or her ideological support. In fact, it’s the mobilizer who has something 
to learn. Because the worker is more knowledgeable. If you adopt this 
perspective, you aren’t able to talk about just anything, you just can’t. 
Instead, you try to learn. I mean, we have oppressed people here. The 
oppressed are the ones to talk. 
 
As a movement, Emek ve Adalet Platformu criticizes the objectification of 
disadvantaged members of society and has focused on how they can help enable 
the oppressed to make their voices heard. At the same time, Barış underlines, it 
does not have the mission to speak out on every single issue:  
 
We believe that it is more helpful for us to speak out in an area in which the 
value of our voice is higher. If we speak out on something, it is important to 
ask whether the people will accept it, or whether the opposing side 
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considers it valid. […] In this respect, we have not adopted a mission like 
filling in every gap [in society]. An organization [should] not say something 
on every issue and fill every gap. 
 
[...] For example, here might be where we’re coming from. How can we have 
an acceptable conversation about the Alevi issue or the Kurdish issue in this 
society? Well, you would probably have to look at the demands. What do 
you demand? Who wants what, and who isn’t giving it? Let’s sit down and 
talk about this. [But] when it turns into a matter of ‘this person gives this 
and that person gives that,’ then we fall into the trap of using quite 
polarizing language. […] You had asked where the inertia [of the movement] 
comes from. It really has everything to do with the difficulty of creating a 
discourse. When you’re not their legitimate representative, at most what 
you can do is express your own opinion on what the issue is and what has to 
be done. That’s all you can do. 
 
Ayşe, expressing a similar opinion, says that Emek ve Adalet Platformu stands by the 
oppressed without trying to read into their intentions. According to Ayşe, the 
platform serves not only to merely confirm the significant dimensions that 
oppression has reached in Turkey, but also to stand side-by-side with the oppressed 
in their struggle. In this respect, Ayşe argues, the platform diverges significantly 
from the traditional Islamic approach: 
 
As far as I can tell, the traditional Islamic approach is that even if you think 
that something is somehow wrong, you don’t really struggle to change it. 
When we were working with the homeless, we would go to them and really 
sit down and talk with them, and they would say, ‘Yes, there really is a 
problem,’ but when it came to struggling against that problem, then we 
would always reach an impasse. Or, they would always ask why they were 
homeless and call into question these people’s intentions. But that’s not 
how it is, of course, if someone is a victim of the system they’re a victim. It 
would be ridiculous to ask for what crime the victim became a victim. At 
least I can see a bit of that in our ‘neighborhood’, by which I mean Islamic 
circles in general. A constant attempt to call intent into question.  
 
Fatma shares Barış’s emphasis on the notion that the platform operates without 
trying to fix every problem and represent every social group and agrees with Ayşe’s 
assessment of the significance of acting alongside the oppressed. In Fatma’s words, 
“Our aim, our principle, is to realize our projects together with the people we can 
touch, people we can affect.” Ali, meanwhile, gives an example of what Fatma calls 
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the movement’s principle of not speaking out on unrelated topics: “On the Kurdish 
issue, for example, none of us among our fellow members has any doubt that Kurds 
are being oppressed by Turks. We’re all in agreement on this topic. But then again, 
we have the principle that we don’t speak out on things we can’t affect. The Kurdish 
issue has its own main actors. So we’re not the ones to talk about it.” 
 
Aligning with this principle is a mode of action Tarık calls “minor politics” [minör 
siyaset], something he defines as follows:  
 
What can we do and what can we say? Are we able to say anything? Does 
[the issue] exceed our area of responsibility? […] We are a group that carries 
out minor politics. Whether we like it or not, we can’t talk big. At least we 
try not to. We don’t say things that we can’t stand behind or will turn out 
empty in the end. […] There’s the issue of whether to talk big and increase 
your visibility, and then go on from there, or whether to speak carefully and 
work to slowly establish your foundation before turning it into something 
bigger later, and we selected the latter [method]. 
 
Barış calls this stance “sustainable opposition” [sürdürülebilir muhalefet]. He argues 
that it is necessary to speak out against the system without also alienating the 
people, using such words to put pressure only to the extent that it does not 
endanger the movement itself. In Barış’s words:   
 
Making big, sweeping statements is usually a sign of not actually doing 
anything. We should be a more humble movement, take more secure steps 
and make sure, in this sense that we can stand behind what we say. Stand 
behind everything we say. There’s no meaning to what we do if we talk big 
and can’t follow up on it. We should speak to as many people as possible, 
then if we really want to say something, we should say it, and we should be 
careful not to use polarizing language. That’s more or less it. But that 
doesn’t mean that we should be ambivalent or always the ones to offer a 
compromise. When we say something, our words should cut sharper than a 
knife. We should be satisfied with the righteousness of our position and 
then do whatever it takes to stand by it. […] But, like I said, what is 
important for us is the action that comes out of this, I mean, putting your 
nose to the grindstone and following through on that humble statement you 
made until it is done, […] to stand truly on the side of the oppressed and the 
disadvantaged, to do as much as we can to the best of our ability. Therefore 
we have a tendency to focus on more specific areas. There’s an issue, and 
we can deal with that issue to a certain extent. [Then we say,] okay, let’s 
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deal with that issue. [And other times, we say,] there’s an issue that’s too big 
for us to handle, or so. We have something to say about this issue but [we 
have to] think how valuable our words or our actions could be on this issue.   
 
In this regard, Ayşe also says that the platform keeps its distance from “macro 
politics” justifying this stance as follows: 
 
The most important priority for Emek Adalet is the concerns faced by the 
people next to us, the people in our neighborhood, living next door. […] 
Even my tiny experience in the Has Party showed me that macro politics is 
really something else. It’s a place with so many different games being 
played, calculations being made. Macro politics is something too big for 
Emek Adalet to handle. And I think it’s something that we shouldn’t do, 
either, because when you’re in macro politics, struggling to stay afloat under 
so many different issues, we run the risk of forgetting the issues right next to 
us. Therefore, Emek Adalet’s concern is to prioritize our locality, begin with 
the local, seeing whether we can change something there, whether we can 
help to heal a wound there. […] And in the end, even if Emek Adalet wanted 
to enter macro politics, say, on the Syria question, what could it do other 
than make a statement, hold a press conference or organize a 
demonstration? Or, what else is there besides giving help to the Syrians in 
the park? That’s a part of it, too. I mean, when you consider the reality of 
things, [macro politics] is something that would be impossible, even if [Emek 
Adalet] wanted it, but from where it stands today, I think it shouldn’t want 
to do it anyway. 
 
What is the target audience that Emek ve Adalet Platformu seeks to reach 
ideologically with its message? Mehmet answers this by pointing to the Sunni 
Turkish members of Turkish society. In other words, according to Mehmet, the 
platform is a movement that emerged from the Muslim “neighborhood” and 
addresses the AK Party constituency. He explains this stance as follows: 
 
For us, we are the ones addressing the AK Party constituency. That is 
something that we’re trying to do. […] I mean, there are limits to what we, 
as the struggle for labor and justice, can do in Turkey based on our 
experiences of struggle, or the Kurdish or Alevi experience of oppression, 
but, beyond this, [we want] to mobilize the average Sunni Turk. We believe 
that it is impossible to liberate the peoples of Turkey without creating some 
kind of political movement there [among ‘average Sunni Turks’]. What are 
our options for action, I mean, do the workers of Kayseri and Bayburt really 
have no other choice beyond the Turkish right? Will they never have another 
choice? That is, can we turn this possibility into an opportunity? That, in a 
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sense, is what we’re struggling with. Emek Adalet is more or less trying to 
address this [group]. 
 
Similarly, Barış defines the social segment that Emek ve Adalet Platformu seeks to 
address as the “religious youth segment” [dindar genç kitle]. It can be argued that 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu aims to give voters with religious sensibilities the 
message that the AK Party is not their only option. In this respect, Tarık finds the 
current administration, which often makes reference to religion, to be quite limited 
in its capacity to actually reflect Islam and Islamism. He criticizes the government by 
emphasizing that other voices have to be heard: 
 
This shouldn’t be the condition that Muslims are in. The AKP are not real 
Islamists; this isn’t what Islamism was supposed to be. [Islamism] had an 
entirely different character in the ’80s. […] The Justice and Development 
Party was not going to be the end result of Islamism, that’s not where it 
should have led. Many different things can come out of the same spring. The 
very diverse publications from the ’80s showed us this. There were so many 
different religious communities, different publishing houses, different 
groups that had such diverse publications that the end result of all of this 
should not have been a single political party and a mass of 40 percent that 
supports it. We’re still shocked that this happened, even now. How did it 
happen that Milli Görüş (National Opinion) ended, the AK Party emerged, 
but not a single other Islamist or Muslim voice can be heard? Actually, the 
fact that 55 thousand people read our statement at the Gezi Park [protests] 
hints a bit at the fact that there’s actually a need for such voices. 
 
In such a political conjuncture, Emek ve Adalet Platformu, as a genuine voice, tries 
to say something different. In this regard, there are many activities that the 
platform has undertaken. Among examples of their actions include supporting 
striking workers at the Turkish Postal Service, Casper, Texim, and Roseteks; charity 
fairs set up to support workers; overnight camp-outs in solidarity with the 
homeless; protest iftars in front of luxury hotels; and “Fraternal Iftars”16.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
16 http://www.emekveadalet.org/biz-kimiz/ 
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The iftars put on by the movement can be said to be their most prominent action, 
one that succeeded in winning public visibility for the movement and its activities17.  
Ali told me about the origins of these iftars, how they suddenly received much more 
media coverage than expected and the fame that came along with such coverage:  
 
Barış said we should do something like that. We never thought it would 
become that [big of a deal]. We did a head count and thought [we might get] 
eighty or ninety people if we told them to come. But İhsan abi [Eliaçık] came 
and supported this [idea]. [Emek ve Adalet Platformu] was not İhsan abi’s 
organization, but he supported [us]. He said he would come. […] After that, a 
couple other famous guys came out in support. Then about 250 people 
came. The media was there, I don’t know who else, the police were there. 
The police came and said, ‘We’re looking at your list, and you’re leftists, but 
we’re looking here and your Islamists.’ They said they were confused or 
something. So this kind of confusion did emerge. Anyway, those 250 people 
came, then to the next iftar, 1000 people came. We had it in Gezi Park, 
where they [later] cut down the trees. We were the first ones to politicize 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 The text of the call to action at the iftars organized in opposition to well-endowed banquets at 
hotel iftars, is as follows: Fasting makes you understand poverty! Fasting is supposed to teach you 
how to be equal, how to resemble one another and understand one another. We spread out our 
table on the ground, next to those who break the fast in their ivy towers. 
 
Fasting begins with the iftar. That which we eat is a gift of the Lord; that which we consume is our 
humanity. It is an honor to be human in this world, and to retain our humanity, we say enough is 
enough. How can people at an extravagant iftar feast look out at a world where starvation runs 
rampant? Ours is not an orientalist curiosity that wonders what poverty looks like from up there. We 
seek the truth. Because we know that the existence of one is inherent in that of the other. Poverty is 
the uninvited guest at the extravagant feast. It stares in the eyes of extreme consumption and 
wastefulness. It is a witness to cruelty and points the way to the ways humans can be so insensitive. 
The poor demands witness. The poor say, look at us and correct yourselves. The poor are those 
whose due has been stolen. They are those who have been denied what God has gifted to humans 
on earth. They are like birds expelled from the world, like a dying fish. 
 
During these days of fasting let us look at the poor and correct ourselves. Let us give unto all 
creatures what is their due, and let us be satisfied with what is ours. Let us correct our greed with 
gratitude and stand in opposition to our poverty. This is our invitation. We invite those who waste to 
have mercy instead. By sharing the gifts of the earth, we multiply them. Let us become wealthier 
through our aid to others. The wealth which we have accumulated beyond our religious donations to 
rid ourselves of the burden of accumulated poverty; let us free ourselves by filling our bellies with 
the levity of the fast. During these days of fasting let us remind those who hold their iftars in ivory 
towers of the laborers who make those towers run. As they pop another olive in their mouth, of the 
waiter standing right next to them, working at minimum wage. Let us remind them of the grains of 
sand below the cobble stones. And let us remind them to use iftar as a means of regrowing a 
humanity that has been depleted in a world of objects we constantly consume. The fast should be 
the soil, and the iftar the water. Come, brothers and sisters, let us till our mud. As the sons and 
daughters of Adam, let us be born anew in the spirit of the iftar. 
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that space. That’s part of our history. We had the second one there. About 
750 to 800 people came to that one. This created a fame that we could 
never have predicted, one we never had calculated. 
The fame which the platform had briefly grasped through iftars, however, was not 
to be permanent, and the media soon lost interest. Nevertheless, one can certainly 
say that they succeeded in being recognized by certain intellectual circles and in 
creating at least a limited public awareness. The impossibility at present of going 
beyond this was something that frequently came up in my conversations with 
respondents. In Mehmet’s estimation, the platform is not yet at a level of 
knowledge and capacity at which they could succeed at mass mobilization. In this 
sense, in Mehmet’s words, even if the movement does not publish a magazine, they 
continued to act “like a kind of magazine group typical of the traditional left.” As a 
result, the group seeks to take smaller steps but with more permanent effect.  
 
This humble aim, however, did not prevent the platform from adopting a rather 
ambitious slogan. The platform uses the motto “Against the enslavement and 
exploitation of God’s servants” [kula kulluğa ve sömürüye karşı] to incite a struggle 
for freedom. Mehmet clarifies what the movement sought to achieve with this 
slogan:  
 
We are Muslims to the extent that we serve no one other than God. But in 
the world in which we live, capitalism wants us to worship and serve a lot of 
things other than God: our bosses, our masters, our state leaders, the police, 
the courts, various state apparatuses, teachers, mentors. All of these expect 
us to serve them, obey them, become their disciples. But God tells us to 
adhere to God alone. The idea of freeing God’s servants from servitude is 
thus a discourse that emphasizes the effort and the struggle to break free of 
all of these chains. 
 
In words that mirror Mehmet’s very closely, Tarık considers the slogan “Against the 
enslavement and exploitation of God’s servants” to be an interpretation of the 
Muslim mantra “la ilahe illallah” (there is no god but God). He explains as follows:  
 
It means not having faith in any authority other than God. And what’s more, 
it means distancing yourself from the start against people’s domination over 
other people, against the authority or power that people have over other 
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people. It means not being enslaved to a company, or to a boss, or to the 
state, or even to an ideology. […] We might say this is an understanding that 
takes God as its only ethic and point of reference. […] [It says that] workers 
should not be slaves to their bosses, that people should not be in any way 
slaves or subjects to the state, to the police, to the military order or to 
authority. 
 
While she also agrees with these two very similar descriptions, Fatma also includes 
a rejection of women’s servitude to men and expands the description: “Not being 
enslaved to anyone but God also means that workers should not be slaves to their 
bosses, and women should not be slaves to men. To me, it is an expression of how 
any relations of oppression between humans should be abolished”. Like my other 
respondents, Ayşe also told me that the backbone of today’s economic and social 
system rested on relations of enslavement and that this system produces 
oppression because it ignores what people believe, value, and want to achieve 
while forcing them into absolute obedience. Regarding the meaning of the 
movement’s motto in this respect, Ayşe explains: 
 
The system that we see creates in all of us just one thing: enslavement to 
one another [kula kul olmak]. From the very beginning, you graduate from 
school—and in school, too, you’re expected to be a slave to your teacher—
then you get a job and you’re expected to be a slave to your boss. Recently 
we visited one of the tents set up to support workers at the picket lines, and 
as one of the women there explained—I mean, like, this is maybe going to 
be a really silly example, but—[while working] they were not allowed to pray 
between official prayer times or that they had to stay at work after the end 
of their shifts. [They don’t allow you] to do something dear to you, 
something that makes you human, or something that you believe in, that is, 
where you are, the boss or the system has its own truths, and you, in one 
way or another, are compelled to obey and follow them. Since we naturally 
have to be opposed to oppression and the oppressor, Emek Adalet is also 
opposed to this [system]. 
 
For Barış, meanwhile, the slogan equates to rebellion. Opposing the enslavement of 
God’s servants is a way of expressing a rebellion against the system that produces 
such enslavement and against the leaders of the country that perpetuate the 
system. 
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When we look at the second part of the slogan, we see the phrase “against 
exploitation.” Mehmet explains that this implies, among others, an emphasis on 
responding to the labor exploitation that exists today. He says this part of the 
slogan focuses on capitalism, which it views as the root cause of today’s 
exploitation. In this sense he positions capitalism as a “regime of exploitation” that 
should be struggled against to remain Muslim.   
As for Tarık, he defines being in opposition to exploitation more broadly: 
“Supporting those who oppose exploitation or who are similarly oppressed by their 
relation to authority or power; taking a position against organizations like the state 
or corporations while supporting the common person.” 
 
While Barış agrees with such definitions, he also adds another level. He argues that 
the discourse of the slogan, while it has a central focus on labor exploitation, 
actually also refers to the class distinctions that arise as a result of labor 
exploitation: “[By saying] exploitation, the first thing that comes to mind is the 
exploitation of labor. That is to say, all kinds of class discrimination—I mean, I think 
[the slogan] also emphasizes that.” 
 
Nevertheless, adopting this slogan has naturally come at a cost for Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu. Tarık says that the movement is criticized by a majority of Muslims 
because of its opposition to exploitation for “entering into socialist jargon.” On the 
other hand, the movement’s proximity to religion also creates the problem that the 
group is perceived among leftist groups as having a “discourse within the system.” 
Tarık says that some leftist groups even find the movement to be liberal. 
Summarizing the situation, he explains, “Leftists generally find us to be liberal, and 
Muslims find us to be insufficiently Muslim.” 
 
As is understood from the slogan, the Emek ve Adalet Platformu calls people to rise 
up against injustice and exploitation and offers Islam as its major driving force. In 
Fatma’s words, the platform “speaks to capitalism by creating a discourse from 
within Islam.” Mehmet, meanwhile, conveys Islam’s role in the movement’s 
discourse as follows: 
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There needs to be an ‘affect’, a source, a motivation that would push people 
to revolt against exploitation. We believe that this [source] is Islam. But this 
does not mean that all oppressed people de facto have to be Muslims or to 
profess a faith. But we believe that the struggle against exploitation is, by its 
nature, a sublime struggle. I would say this is something that Muslims do, a 
Muslim stance. [But] the individuals or actors that carry out the struggle may 
not necessarily be believers. In any case, faith is not a matter for us to deal 
with. It is a matter between God and His servant. But we think that, within 
the current system, that what Islam tells us can bring us to a real point, can 
bring us closer to victory. 
 
Similarly, Tarık underlines the reflex to take Islam as a reference and a point of 
reminder. He describes this as “conservatism that knows what it wants to 
conserve,”18 saying: 
 
Until now, I had always been allergic to conservatism. But for the last year, I 
have begun to think that we, too, have an Islam that we are trying to 
conserve. In fact, we’re trying to hold on to something that we’re in danger 
of losing. This is a very conservative kind of reflex. We can’t just sit back and 
say that things come and go; we’ll take whatever comes over time. We can’t 
just sit back and say ‘time’ made things change and that’s that, or that 
Islamism is over and we have to talk about something else. It shouldn’t just 
disappear—and we’re trying to hold on to a trace of it, hold on to something 
that may no longer be possible, and this is a conservative kind of thing. But 
this conservatism is more that a political conservatism, it’s a conservatism 
that knows what it wants to conserve. İsmet Özel put it this way: 
Conservatives don’t know what they are conserving, or what they are trying 
to conserve. So I think we can call ourselves conservatives who hope that 
they know what they are conserving. 
 
Similarly, Barış clarifies that references Islam are a constituent part of the platform’s 
vision of an ideal society. Here, he refers to the movement’s practice of referring to 
the period in which the Prophet Muhammad lived and asking how the basic 
principles of that period might be lived today: 
 
History is not something that is always progressing. For us, the basic logic of 
an ideal social order is one in which justice is secured, so just like the period 
                                                                                                                                                                    
18 Nevertheless, Tarık’s approach to conservatism was not expressed by my other respondents. The 
latter, when asked about it, responded that the movement was not entirely conservative. 
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in which Hazret-i Muhammad lived, when the four caliphs lived, etc. It’s kind 
of like a dream that exists in the past. I mean, the farther you go away from 
it, that place is still your benchmark. The farther away you go, the worse it 
is; and the closer you are, the better. We have this idea, like, to establish an 
ideal society based on that, but, I mean, this doesn’t mean that we should 
live with camels or something like that. After all, it’s our basic worry, how 
something like this could come about in today’s world. How can we build a 
life with those basic principles, the potential this has. 
 
Despite all of the leftist and Islamic sentiments it carries, however, the Emek ve 
Adalet Platformu claims that it does not represent a physical space that might serve 
as a bridge between the left and Islam. The participants in the movement in 
particular attempt to make this clear on the platform’s website and in its statement 
of basic principles. In fact, Fatma said that this text was revised in an attempt to 
erase this image of being a bridge:   
 
Now we have revised our statement on principles and so maybe that thing in 
people’s minds will disappear a little—I mean the idea that Emek Adalet 
serves as a bridge between the left and Islam will disappear a little. We got 
rid of that article. It became a statement of principles that focused more on 
[the idea that] ‘Emek Adalet is a society-oriented, localist movement’. 
 
In this respect, Ali describes the movement’s discourse as “producing something 
without turning our backs to the people, together with the people without being 
contaminated by liberalism.” 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used interview responses to elaborate several aspects of the Emek 
ve Adalet Platformu: Its emergence, its development, the characteristics of its 
founding cadre, its structure, the way it operates, its membership profile, its 
activities and its political views. The Emek ve Adalet Platformu is a movement that 
emerged in 2011 when a group with a background in leftist politics sought contact 
with an Islamist group. This group, which came together to construct a common 
critical discourse against the current order and its problems, initially had more 
leftist members among its ranks. Over time, however, the platform moved toward a 
more Islamist line and became an organization in which individuals with higher 
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religious sensitivities came to the forefront. As a result, looking at the state of the 
movement today, I show how being Muslim is a central facet of the way the 
platform generates its discourse and approaches current events. 
 
As a result of this facet, I argue, the target audience of the platform is the Turkish 
and Sunni segment of Turkish society. The membership profile of the platform 
shows mostly individuals who are middle class, university graduates and young. 
Interviewees characterized themselves as being neither upper nor lower class, well-
educated and between 25 and 35 years hold. Decisions are taken at the platform’s 
meetings, held every two weeks at its office in Kıztaşı. The platform rejects on 
principle the notions of hierarchy and elitism. It is careful to operate in a non-
hierarchical way both in terms of relationships within the platform as well as in its 
struggle alongside disadvantaged members of society. My respondents told me 
that, in pursuing such a struggle, they operated under the principle that they were 
not more qualified than such members of society. They thus position themselves 
not as “saviors of the oppressed” but as their “supporters.” 
 
The ideology of the Emek ve Adalet Platformu movement is populist in that it 
promotes local-oriented action that is appropriate for Turkish society’s political and 
social dynamics. Its structure enables it to create a discourse and to act in direct 
coordination with a victimized subject, without excluding or ignoring “the people.” 
They are motivated by an impulse to act without putting themselves in the 
forefront. My respondents thus expressed their mode of action or struggle not as 
one “for the people” or “on behalf of the people” but in terms of “walking side by 
side with the people.” 
 
The platform does not seek to engage in all political struggles or to find solutions for 
all of society’s ills, because, as my respondents said, they fear that such aspirations 
would both prevent them from focusing on a few key issues as well as leading to an 
elitism in which they would speak “on behalf of” others. As a result, the movement 
sought to avoid speaking on matters over which they had no control, but rather 
focusing on events in their own surroundings. My respondents called this principle 
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“minor politics,” “sustainable opposition” or “not speaking on behalf of others and 
not speaking on topics outside of our reach.” 
 
In light of these principles, the Emek ve Adalet Platformu understands its mission as 
creating a discourse against the oppression of labor by capital and taking a 
corresponding stand against the exploitation of labor. This is the reason that they 
use the slogan “Against the enslavement and exploitation of God’s servants” to call 
others to act to free the oppressed from all that enslaves and exploits them. As a 
natural consequence of this discourse’s focus on labor, it also includes a stark 
criticism of capitalism. However, unlike other leftist organizations, which usually 
base such a criticism on the basis of Marxism, the platform does so with reference 
to Islam. In other words, the Emek ve Adalet Platformu is a movement that 
addresses capitalism by creating a discourse from within Islam (Fatma). While 
basing its call to resistance on Islam, it simultaneously finds the resources for its 
mobilization within Islam. For the movement, the means of establishing a just and 
prosperous society thus lie in Islam.  
 
By taking into consideration this “identity card” for the movement, in the next 
chapter, I will look at performance ground of the movement, which is the public 
sphere, and then place the movement into this space and analyze its actions and 
practices in this “space of appearances”. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMEK VE ADALET PLATFORMU IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will define the Arendtian public sphere and place Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu in this sphere by discussing the plurality that it created there. Then I will 
introduce the term “subaltern counterpublic”19 (based on Nancy Fraser’s 
understanding of the concept) and argue that Emek ve Adalet Platformu constitutes 
such a counterpublic. In the third part, I will discuss the “democratic ethos” and 
“enlarged mentality” that the movement brought to the public sphere. Finally, in 
the last section, I will problematize a paradox in the movement and look the extent 
to which the movement preserves the democratic ethos it professes in the public 
sphere within its inner structures and relationships as well.   
 
4.2 Arendt and the Public Sphere  
What place does political action play in public life? How do societies create spaces 
where politics can be discussed openly? And in societies where open political 
discussion is restricted, is it better to retreat into a life of contemplation or to try 
and carve open a political space in the public sphere? For Hannah Arendt, societies 
in which active and open political participation was possible are rare in history. 
Having experienced the darkness of totalitarianism, Arendt sought to discover 
under what conditions societies are able to develop public spheres in which political 
action was possible. In this section, I examine Arendt’s understanding of public 
sphere and situate the Emek ve Adalet Platformu within this concept. 
 
According to Arendt, beginning from Plato, a political tradition emerged in which 
political life and the public sphere were undervalued, and contemplation was 
                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Although her terminology includes the word “subaltern,” Fraser does not discuss this concept in 
relation to the postcolonial literature. Some studies thus prefer to only use the term 
“counterpublic.” However, throughout this thesis, I have adhered to the original form of the term.  
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exalted (Villa, Politics, 1999, pp. 204-205).20 The skeptical approach of political 
philosophy towards the faculties of opinion and judgment, the positioning of 
monological Reason in opposition to these faculties, and the enmity towards 
plurality in this tradition pushes Arendt to think outside of the Western canon of 
political philosophy (Villa, 2008, pp. 308-9). As a result of this mindset, in The 
Human Condition Arendt presents ‘labor’, ‘work’ and ‘action’ as three basic 
conditions of human life and defines the private and public spheres as the arenas in 
which these conditions were expressed (Sezer, 2014, p. 647). According to Arendt, 
many philosophers blurred these three conditions and thus interpreted them in a 
distorted way (Sezer, 2014, p. 643). In The Human Condition, Arendt problematizes 
this distortion—the “sustained and systematic devaluation of the political life and 
the public realm in the Western philosophical tradition”—by correlating it with 
“Platonic prejudices” (Villa, 1999, pp. 204-205). Rather, Arendt aims to demonstrate 
the importance of politics, giving politics its reputation back, positioning “action” to 
the place it deserves in the hierarchy of human activities (Villa, 1999, p. 205) and 
emphasizing the importance of the concepts “public sphere” and “plurality” (Villa, 
2008, pp.302-327; Sezer, 2014, p. 646). 
 
Arendt characterizes the public sphere by the absence of coercion/violence or an 
authoritarian hierarchy. In this framework, the public sphere is the space between 
individuals; political action is the element that provides either the establishment or 
preservation of this space; and human plurality is the constitutive element of the 
political world (Villa, 2008, p. 309). At the hearth of politics, there are plural and 
relative opinions and thus innumerable possible perspectives (Arendt, 1998, p. 57) 
regarding humankind’s shared problems: “one deed, and sometimes one word, 
suffices to change every constellation” (Arendt, 1998, p. 190).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Arendt points out the contrast between philosophical life (bios theoretikos) and political life (bios 
politikos) and claims that the gap between the two was deepened after the trial of Socrates in 
Athens (Villa, 1999, pp. 204-5; Sezer, 2014, p. 643). As a reaction to the atmosphere of political 
oppression, Plato “revolted against the civic life of Athenian democracy” (Villa, 2008, p. 308) and 
asserted a political thought in which “the standpoint and values of the contemplative man” were 
positioned supreme and politics was framed as chaotic and dangerous. 
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Politics deal with finding a nonviolent ground to resolve this plurality and many-
sidedness by prioritizing togetherness. Politics takes its power from words. In this 
sense, political action is a “dramaturgical” concept that is based on the 
performance of words and deeds on a public stage (Villa, 2008, p. 311): “with word 
and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a 
second birth” (Arendt, 1998, p. 176). According to Arendt, “a life without speech 
and without action is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life 
because it is no longer lived among men” (Arendt, 1998, p. 176). “We humanize 
what is going on in the world and in ourselves,” Arendt writes elsewhere, “by 
speaking of it and in the course of speaking of it we learn to be human” (Arendt, 
1968, p. 25). In this framework, action and speech enable individuals to define who 
they are (Arendt, 1998, p. 178), to distinguish themselves from others and to 
display their distinctness in the public sphere (p. 197). Therefore public sphere is a 
“space of appearances” in which individuals try to express themselves and are 
recognized by others (Sezer, 2014, p. 652).  
 
Thus Arendt points to the connection between freedom and equality in this “space 
of appearances” (Berktay, 2015, pp. 707-8). She explains that public and political 
freedom means participation in decision-making processes as well as appearance 
and recognition in the public sphere: “Men are free as distinguished from their 
possessing the gift for freedom as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to 
be free and to act are the same” (Arendt, 1961, p. 153). In addition to this, in order 
to appear in public debates using action and speech, individuals have to be equal. 
However Arendt does not see freedom and equality as concepts “inherent in human 
nature”. Rather, equality and freedom “are conventional and artificial, the products 
of human efforts and qualities of man-made world” (Arendt, 1990, p. 31). Equality is 
guaranteed by institutions and laws, “not because all men were born or created 
equal but on the contrary because men were by nature not equal” (Arendt, 1990, p. 
30). Equality is a civic status received by citizenship or political activity (Sezer, 2014, 
p. 652) and similar to freedom, it cannot be thought outside of public space, since 
both are gained by the participating action and debate in public space (Sezer, 2014, 
p. 653). With this perspective Arendt rejects the liberal definition of equality and 
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freedom, which positions these two concepts as natural rights. Using the example 
of the Holocaust, Arendt asserts that it is possible to deprive people of all natural 
rights. And this is why she offers a concept of equality based on laws, i.e. the “right 
to have rights” (1976, pp. 296-7). 21 
 
Accordingly, Arendt presents politics not merely as an arena of power relations, but 
as a stage where better and higher potentialities of human life can be realized. The 
ability for citizens to appear and be represented in the public sphere is critical both 
to conceal existing inequalities and to enable a radical openness where everyone 
can participate. The presentation of different perspectives creates a plurality and 
interaction that enables the public sphere to flourish.   
 
It is my contention that Emek ve Adalet Platformu  can be viewed as one of the civil 
society organizations that aims to achieve such plurality (that which is understood 
in Arendt) and possibilities of interaction in the Turkish public sphere. The 
movement presents different ideas on exploitation, labor, social justice, equality 
and other topics under the slogan “Kula kulluğa ve sömürüye karşı” (Against the 
enslavement and exploitation of God’s servants). This combination of socialist and 
religious sensitivities introduces a new character to the public sphere. However, 
along with this plurality they have brought to the official public sphere, they also 
constitute their own public sphere, something which I will define as a subaltern 
counterpublic, to borrow a term from Nancy Fraser. In the next sections, I will 
present Fraser’s conceptualization of the term subaltern counterpublic and argue 
how Emek ve Adalet Platformu forms such a subaltern counterpublic.              
 
4.2 A Sphere for Discursive Interaction: Subaltern Counterpublics 
Even though my analysis will draw from Arendt’s conception of public sphere, it was 
Jürgen Habermas whose conception has become predominant in the contemporary 
political theory literature on public sphere. Nancy Fraser (1992) asserts that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
21 For further reading on the issue, see: Balibar, Etienne: Citizenship; Gündoğdu, Ayten: Rightlessness 
in an Age of Rights.   
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Habermas22 defined the bourgeois public sphere as an over-arching, comprehensive 
and single public. According to Fraser this definition poses a dual problem. On the 
one hand, Habermas “fails to examine other, non-liberal, non-bourgeois competing 
public spheres” and so idealizes the liberal public sphere (p. 115) at the expense of 
missing the importance of multiplicity of competing publics and conflictual 
relationship between publics (p. 116). Contrary to Habermas’s bourgeois 
conception,  
 
[…] public spheres are not spaces of zero-degree culture, equally hospitable 
to any possible form of cultural expression (p. 126). […] public spheres are 
not only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition they are 
arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities (Fraser, 1992, p. 
125).  
 
Therefore Fraser emphasizes that in egalitarian, multicultural societies there cannot 
be a “single, comprehensive public sphere” (p. 126). On the other hand, by making 
such a definition Habermas does not position social equality as necessary for 
participatory parity in public spheres (p. 121). Unlike what Habermas assumes, 
Fraser argues, “in some societies, full parity of participation in public debate and 
deliberation is not within the reach of possibility” (p. 122). In stratified societies, 
due to the existence of social inequality “deliberative processes in public spheres 
will tend to operate to the advantage of dominant groups and to the disadvantage 
of subordinates” (pp. 122-23). In this context, while subordinated groups are 
absorbed by dominant groups, the “we” that emerges reflects only the dominant 
one (p. 123). Therefore subordinated social groups develop strategies and 
constitute alternative publics in order to maintain their visibility despite the 
supervision of dominant groups. Fraser names these as subaltern counterpublics, 
which have the aim of “signaling that they are parallel discursive arenas where 
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 The public sphere is a space that emerges between civil society and the state, one in which citizens 
can participate on an equal and free basis, where they have the opportunity to discuss matters 
relating to the common interest and where they can inform the state's institutional apparatus of the 
consensus that they have reached. Inspired by Hegel's tripartite division between family, civil society 
and state, Habermas locates the public sphere in between civil society and the state. While civil 
society represents the realm of private freedom, the freedom enjoyed by individuals in the public 
sphere is known as "public freedom". (Habermas,  1991) 
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members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs” (p. 
123). Thus she propounds a twofold concept for subaltern counterpublics: On the 
one hand, subaltern counterpublics are arenas of “withdrawal and regroupment”; 
on the other, they are “bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed 
towards wider publics” (p. 124). In this sense, she explains that in stratified societies 
participatory parity can develop with the existence of multiple competing publics (p. 
125).   
 
Thus subaltern counterpublics as the field of discursive contestation can “bring to 
fore issues that might have been overlooked, purposely ignored or suppressed by 
dominant publics” (Kampourakis, 2016). Supporting this argument, Fraser explains 
that “in general, the proliferation of subaltern counterpublics meant a widening of 
discursive contestation, and that was a good thing in stratified societies.” However, 
she does not define all subaltern counterpublics as democratic spaces. This is why 
she also utters the risk of presence of anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian subaltern 
counterpublics (Fraser, 1992, p. 124).  
 
4.3 Emek ve Adalet Platformu as a form of Subaltern Counterpublic 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu has emerged with the efforts of people who had previous 
membership experiences in “leftist” and “Islamist” groups but who had left these 
groups due to their disappointment regarding their organizations. The mixture of 
these two groups has created a synthesis of left and Islam to a certain extent and 
transformed Emek ve Adalet Platformu into a movement that attributed importance 
to both labor and religion. In today’s Turkey, at first glance the movement may look 
like a representative of the majority, if we consider that the cadre’s makeup of 
basically Turkish-Sunni youth, its central emphasis on religious values, its target 
audience and its hetero-normativity. However, by examining it more closely, we can 
see that the movement challenges the official public sphere via its discourse, and 
thus the movement falls into to a “subaltern” location. Elaborating on this point, I 
argue that on the one hand, their way of embracing Islam and their criticism 
towards ruling AK Party government puts Islam at its discursive center, while on the 
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other hand, their criticism of capitalism in their actions and discourse and their 
pointing to social justice as an inherent part of Islam and a way of overcoming 
capitalism make the movement a “subaltern”. Thus Emek ve Adalet Platformu 
creates a “parallel discursive arena” where it “circulates counter-discourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of its identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 
1992, p. 123) in order to be seen in the public sphere. This parallel discursive arena 
is, expressed in Fraser’s terminology, a “subaltern counterpublic”.    
 
What characteristics, exactly, does Emek ve Adalet Platformu have that kept it 
distinct from the official public sphere and cause it to constitute its own subaltern 
counterpublic? The first of these characteristics is the criticism that it voiced against 
the hegemonic discourse in the public sphere. In order to discuss this point first let 
us remember the target audience of the movement which is defined as AK Party 
constituency (Mehmet) and religious youth segment (Barış) by my respondents.  
 
From this aspect Emek ve Adalet Platformu presents an alternative to the Turkish-
Sunni segment other than Turkish right. Mehmet explains that, while doing this, the 
movement could position itself outside of the existing political powers and political 
opportunism and this is why, with its claims to authenticity, it can protect itself 
from being absorbed by the system:   
 
After all, there are limits to what a major political party can do, to the kind of 
politics a political party can pursue within a political party regime. What 
we’re attempting is something entirely different: to mobilize a base, you 
might say to serve as an organized community [cemaat]. We seek to, and 
have experience with, pursuing a politics through other [non-party] 
networks. That’s why we never participated in any part of the AK Party 
project, either in the short or long term. The system attempted to coopt us 
but this wasn’t possible, that is to say, we have several barriers against that. 
 
Then what is this “authenticity”? Here we encounter a concept of social justice 
inherent to Islam. Mehmet describes the discussion of social justice as a “discussion 
carried out among Muslims, a discussion that takes place, in one way or another, 
within a tradition of Islamic state governance.” In this sense, he positions capitalism 
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as the reason for the corruption with which that the era was contaminated and 
explains the approach of the movement towards capitalism as follows:   
 
The pursuit of what God has granted to humankind is for us a form of 
worship, and we believe that by sharing this justly, by producing justly and 
dividing this production justly we can eliminate the social and economic 
injustice of this world. This [injustice] is, we believe, the biggest danger to 
the existence, to the way of life, of Islam and Muslims. I mean, Muslims are 
not going to be destroyed today by alcohol, prostitution, or immorality. They 
will be destroyed—they are being destroyed and corrupted—by this thing, 
that is, by capitalism. I mean, if we want to remain Muslim, we believe that 
the first thing we have to struggle against is capitalism. Because capitalism 
is, in effect, a regime of exploitation, to stand against exploitation is for us in 
practice one of the primary pillars of religious faith today.  
 
Supporting the words of Mehmet, Tarık describes the stance of the movement as 
“being concerned with the unjust treatment caused by capitalist and neoliberal 
system”. At this point Emek ve Adalet Platformu points to Islam as a means to 
overcome the systemic crisis. Tarık summarizes the dominant understanding in the 
movement as “an approach that takes only God as a moral guide and reference”. 
Expanding on this approach, with a uniting argument that ties together the 
statements of Mehmet and Tarık, Fatma explains their rejection of capitalism as 
“producing a narrative within Islam that comprehensively stands against 
capitalism”. Mehmet takes this argument one step further and says that the 
movement sees Islam “as an ‘affect’, a source, a motivation that would push people 
to revolt against exploitation”. However, here he also underlines that the 
movement does not expect everyone to unite under the common denominator of 
“Muslimhood”. 
 
Ali explains this stance, which rejects patronizing attitudes, as follows:  
 
For my part, I love Marx, I do. But I don’t make him my central focus. As 
someone trying to be a [good] Muslim, I make Hazret-i Muhammad my 
central focus. [The] things [I want to say about society] flow naturally from 
there. But I would not impose this [belief] on anybody. […] I have my own 
things to do with religion, another has something else. Somewhere we’ll 
overlap, and that’s where we will start our conversation. That’s how we take 
decisions in any case. 
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Thus while Emek ve Adalet Platformu puts Islam and Prophet Mohammad to the 
center of its criticism of capitalism, it supports this criticism with an understanding 
of social justice associated with Islam. However, Mehmet emphasizes that they did 
not do this with an Islamic discourse devoid of Islam. In this sense, he explains the 
difference between Emek ve Adalet Platformu and Islamists as follows:    
 
We diverge from the Islamists in a number of ways. To us, Islamists are not 
really Islamists. They have abandoned the fundamental demands and 
injunctions of Islamism. Thus the first thing we should say is that, in Turkey, 
the ideology of Islamism and Islamist actors have let themselves expire, that 
is to say, to the extent that Islamism remains a means of achieving political 
power and continues to present itself as such there can be no Islamism. 
Islamism is an oppositional movement against an established order. So when 
you try and patch Islamism onto political power, there is no result, and there 
cannot be. […] What the AK Party is doing today is Islamism on the discursive 
level. What we need in practice is, especially here, a political economy. At a 
concrete level [the AK Party’s discourse] has nothing at all to do with 
Islamism. [They say] we are going to become an integrated cog in the wheel 
of capitalism and the globalized system, but as long as we still invoke the 
name of God and the prophet we count as Islamists. So, we believe that this 
is not Islamism.  
 
At this point Emek ve Adalet Platformu criticizes the ruling party for acting in 
concert with capitalism. Barış explains this criticism by saying, “Capitalism is 
establishing itself in our country. In establishing itself, it does not do this with an 
imperial style. It does so with AK Party and the like”. Tarık reads this situation as an 
injury to Muslimhood: “In doing such things in the name of Islam, they [AK Party] 
actually did a lot of harm to Muslim discourse. They opened a wound there”. 
Accordingly, referring to this wound and loss, the mission of the movement is, not 
to invent or discover something new, but to remind people of something that 
already exists at the source of Islam (Mehmet).  
 
The things that Mehmet offers to remember, however, refer to a challenging 
struggle. Finding their success on this subject limited, Ali presents his ideas as 
follows:   
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We have had difficulty getting across how important the issue of labor is in 
Islam. We have also had difficulty getting across the fact that there is no 
place for capital accumulation in Islam. And we still haven’t gotten across 
the fact that there is no such thing as state-led developmentalism 
[kalkınmacılık] in Islam. And the fact that there needs to be a perception of 
reality outside of this [particular] interpretation of Islam—that is something 
that we haven’t been able to bring about. 
 
My interviewees found the difficulty of spreading the group’s message, noted by Ali, 
to be understandable. For example, in Mehmet’s description of the challenges faced 
by the movement, he refers to a perception of the group as an “unfaithful child” 
[hain evlat], since they criticize their own neighborhood (the Muslim community) 
and question the actions of people with their same background. In his words,   
 
We have spent the last ten years struggling to challenge the political failure 
and distortions brought about by our incorrect understanding of the issues. 
And this was quite a challenge. It was really quite a challenge to destroy our 
own area. [We were] constantly put in the position of being the ‘unfaithful 
child’. 
 
Fatma defines this challenge as “being able to speak to the Muslim neighborhood 
without drifting apart from it”. In order not to lead to the stalemate of this 
disengagement, Ayşe explains that the movement sustains its communication 
without degrading and ignoring the ethical or religious codes prevalent in Muslim 
circles:    
 
These Muslim circles have certain codes [of conduct], and, to be honest, I 
think that it is impossible to get anywhere—to move the discussion 
forward—by fighting against these codes or by constantly taking jabs at 
them. I mean, if you threaten their sense of being Muslim, the values they 
may hold dear, if you understand the system as one based on the essential 
badness of what they believe, then [Muslims] are not going to talk to you, 
even if they might have something to say. 
 
Accordingly, Emek ve Adalet Platformu has to strike a sensitive balance:  
 
What we’re doing is something very difficult. We’re doing something that 
nobody else in this country is doing, trying to say something that nobody 
else has ever said. We are neither enemies of the AK Party, nor AK Party 
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supporters. I mean, it’s actually very difficult at this moment to not be a part 
of this—to not pursue a politics in line [with the AK Party]. 
 
When we analyze Emek ve Adalet Platformu from all these aspects, we see that the 
movement constructs a parallel discursive arena by challenging the official public 
sphere, where political discourse is shaped by the AK Party government, while still 
adopting a concept of social justice inherent to Islam. In its attempt to carve out its 
own discursive space, I argue, the Emek ve Adalet Platformu represents a subaltern 
counterpublic in Fraser’s sense. Subaltern counterpublics, as I noted, have multiple 
characteristics. On the one hand, their challenge of dominant discourse by its 
nature includes a democratic ethos and an attempt to broaden interlocutors’ 
intellectual horizons. On the other, the internal dynamics of this subaltern 
counterpublic are not necessarily dynamic. The next two sections cover these two 
aspects of the subaltern counterpublic created through the work of Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu. In the next section, I will present the concepts of democratic ethos and 
enlarged mentality, as well as the manifestations of these concepts as carried out 
by Emek ve Adalet Platformu in the public sphere.  
 
4.4 Emek ve Adalet Platformu in the Public Sphere: Creation of a Democratic Ethos 
and an Enlarged Mentality  
William Connolly (2004) defines the “ethos of democracy” as a concept that 
problematizes final markers (God, natural law, the divine right of the kings, the 
natural basis of traditional identities, a fictive contract) that reinstate themselves 
and also encourages a culture of agonistic respect (Connolly, 2004, p. 154). 
According to Connolly “the democratic ethos treats the contestation of final 
markers as a contribution to freedom, self-formation and self-governance” (p. 154) 
and also it “cultivates a politics of agonistic respect among multiple constituencies 
who respond differentially to mysteries of being while acknowledging each other to 
be worthy of respect partly because they are implicated in this common condition” 
(Connolly, 2004, p. 154). Here agonistic respect comes with an ethos of care. 
Connolly thus depicts a politics “in which one of the ways of belonging together 
involves strife and in which one of the democratizing ingredients in strife is the 
cultivation of care for the ways opponents respond to mysteries of existence” 
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(Connolly, 1991, p. 33). In this formulation, if one enters into an agonistic dialogue 
by contesting the alternative ideals, this dialogue would result in “interpreting 
actuality, projecting future possibilities and identifying present dangers” (Connolly, 
1991, p. 33).   
 
In addition to this, Connolly argues that “some elements of a democratic ethos can 
extend beyond the walls of the state” (Connolly, 2004, p. 155). Such a democratic 
ethos is transnational and exceeds traditional institutions. Moreover, Connolly sees 
the democratic ethos as the best instrument of managing identity/difference 
paradox and overcoming the crisis of representation (Shapcott, 2004, p. 71). In this 
sense, the democratic ethos is an ethos of pluralization, an ethos that “strives to 
create more room for difference by calling attention to the contingent, relational 
character of established identities” (Connolly, 1991, p. 48). The democratic ethos 
enables the development of different subjectivities which are contingent, 
interdependent and contested (Shapcott, 2004, p. 71). For Connolly the democratic 
ethos is an element that fosters pluralism and recognizes identity and difference 
(Shapcott, 2004, p. 71). In this formulation, “the ethos of democracy has 
territorial/institutional conditions of existence, but it also embodies a crucial 
cultural disposition” (Connolly, 2004, p. 154). From this perspective, a democratic 
ethos enables the co-existence of multiple minorities. Individuals develop different 
understandings; however “uncertain commonalities and shared uncertainties 
cultivate respect for a politics of democratic governance” (p. 154). Connolly calls 
this a “productive ambiguity” and explains that it balances the governance and 
denaturalizes settled identities (Connolly, 2004, p. 155). 
 
Peter Euben (2003), meanwhile, defines democratic ethos as a triggering factor that 
encourages and insists on the sharing of power and responsibility (Euben, 2003, p. 
70). For Euben, this is a sine qua non of “dignity as well as self and mutual respect” 
(p. 115). A democratic ethos approaches hierarchies with suspicion and prejudice. In 
this sense, “a democratic ethos entails an egalitarian constitution of cultural and 
political life that encourages people to participate in defining their own troubles 
and possibilities and to articulate those troubles in public as citizens” (p. 115). This 
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participation is accompanied by the sharing of discourses and this is why a 
democratic ethos claims that political knowledge is constituted discursively rather 
than deductively. The constitution of political knowledge can be enhanced by 
heated yet inclusive debates among people who may have different opinions about 
what should be done (p. 70).  
 
In addition to these, Euben asserts that a democratic ethos can accept some 
economic inequality. However, this is constrained by two conditions: “Economic 
inequality should not compromise political equality or legitimate moral or 
significant social inequalities” (Euben, 2003, p. 70). Euben also defines the 
democratic ethos as “a social process through which fixed identities and naturalized 
conventions periodically confront their conventional status” (p. 70) and thus the 
democratic ethos considers social and cultural conventions as modes of 
performance constituted by thousands of small and large actions (p.70). Lastly, 
Euben explains that “a democratic ethos assumes that democracy is much a politics 
of disturbance as a form of government and order” (p.70). 
 
As we see from Connolly and Euben, a democratic ethos enables the pluralization of 
democratic spaces of action. It is a way of viewing politics that promotes the sharing 
of power and responsibility and encourages an egalitarian system in which each 
citizen has the right to participate fully in public debates. A democratic ethos 
enables people to question their identities and to put themselves in others’ shoes, 
thus challenging and reformulating collective identities imposed by the state. A 
democratic ethos not only recognizes difference in society, it also fosters that 
difference. Thus a democratic ethos transforms the conflicting states and heated 
debates stemming from difference into a productive plurality and respect; it makes 
the democratic space flourish and creates spaces where different identities can 
meet and co-exist.       
 
Within this definitional context, Emek ve Adalet Platformu emerges an actor in the 
public sphere that seeks to create a democratic ethos. The movement has created a 
plurality and multi-vocality in the public sphere, reaching out to different identities 
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and creating bonds of solidarity with them. The movement goes beyond settled 
identities and empathizes with different identities like workers, homeless people 
and migrants. Emek ve Adalet Platformu also establishes an intellectual space for 
this ethos. Every Thursday, for example, the movement hosts speeches and invites 
people who are experts in their fields to discuss current or important events. The 
topics change from week to week but have included issues like “the criminal aspect 
of worker deaths and the subcontractor system”23, “the opportunity for a new 
language of Islamism”24, “the politics of health and the transformation of health 
care in Turkey”25, “women’s causes in the new Turkey”26, “rooting peace in 
society”27 and so on. They also have constituted several reading groups. In one, 
called Siyer Readings, participants discussed the lives of the prophets, caliphs and 
preeminent figures in religion28. In the reading group Kent (City) Readings, 
participants discussed Islamic art, Ottoman architecture and non-Muslims’ 
perceptions of Islamic art and Ottoman architecture29. Another reading group 
dedicated itself to understanding the relationship between socialism and Islam30. 
The movement is thus a structure that aims to promote learning and the mutual 
and deliberative discussion of a variety of topics.  
 
As stated by Peter Euben (2003), “a democratic ethos entails an egalitarian 
constitution of cultural and political life that encourages people to participate in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
23 http://www.emekveadalet.org/soylesiler/sohbet-is-cinayetleri-ve-taseronluk-sistemi/ 
 
24 http://www.emekveadalet.org/duyurular/yeni-bir-islamcilik-dilinin-imkani-halil-ibrahim-yenigun-
ile-sohbet/ 
25 http://www.emekveadalet.org/genel/saglik-politikalari-ve-turkiyede-saglikta-donusum-zeki-
kilicaslan/ 
 
26 http://www.emekveadalet.org/etkinlik/persembe-soylesileri-yeni-turkiyede-kadin-davalari/ 
 
27 http://www.emekveadalet.org/soylesiler/persembe-soylesileri-nukhet-sirman-ile-barisi-
toplumsallastirmak/ 
 
28 http://www.emekveadalet.org/etkinlik/siyer-okuma-grubu-6/ 
 
29 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/25-aralik-kent-okumalari/ 
 
30 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/turkiye%E2%80%99de-islam-sosyalizm-iliskisi-okuma-
grubu-ve-programi/ 
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defining their own troubles and possibilities and to articulate those troubles in 
public as citizens”. In this sense, Emek ve Adalet Platformu takes to the field in 
solidarity with subaltern people, disadvantaged groups and groups exposed to 
unjust treatment. Thus Emek ve Adalet Platformu aims to unite contemplative 
activities like reading groups and conversation series with action in the streets. For 
example, every month on Galatasaray Square, the movement held 65 “sit-ins for 
conscience and justice” [vicdan ve adalet nöbeti] to make workers who lost their 
lives while performing their labor visible in public. In doing so, the Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu acted in solidarity with the families of workers who sought justice with 
these sit-ins31. With regard to this action, the movement also started a petition  
campaign in order to declare April 28th as the day of commemoration and 
mourning for those who lost their lives in work-related deaths caused by employer 
negligence (“work murders” or iş cinayetleri)32. 
 
Interconnected to creating a democratic ethos, the movement also enlarges 
mentalities by creating a ground for the communication and interaction of different 
identities. Enlarged mentality is a concept that finds itself at the core of Arendtian 
public sphere. Arendt defines the public sphere as the realm of interaction and 
plurality where decisions come into being, are shared and are discussed. To put it 
differently, the public sphere is the realm where open-ended debates about the 
structure of laws and institutions of a particular public-political world were made by 
using “persuasion, negotiation and compromise” (Arendt, 1990, pp. 86-7; Villa, 
2008, p. 321). This is why the public sphere is a realm defined through 
communication. Of course, opinions are always open to debate; “debate is the very 
essence of the political life” (Arendt, 2000, p. 556), and debate can cause conflict. 
Alternatively, opinions are also open to exchange: through communication, we can 
“think in the place of everybody else. This involves ‘potential agreement with 
others’ coming finally to some agreement” (Arendt, 1992, p. 104). Thus Arendt 
                                                                                                                                                                    
31 http://www.emekveadalet.org/haberyorum/65-vicdan-ve-adalet-nobetinin-ardindan/ 
32http://www.emekveadalet.org/etkinlik/28-nisan-is%CC%A7cinayetlerini-anma-ve-yas-gunu-ilan-
edilsin-olenleri-an-kalanlar-icin-mucadele-et/ 
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refers to Kant and uses the notions of “enlarged mentality” or “representative 
thinking” to explain the faculty of putting oneself in others’ shoes, communication 
and opinion based plurality in the public sphere (Sezer, 2014, p. 675):  
 
Communicability obviously depends on the enlarged mentality; one can 
communicate only if one is able to think from the other person's standpoint; 
otherwise one will never meet him, never speak in such a way that he 
understands. By communicating one’s feelings, one’s pleasures and 
disinterested delights, one tells one’s choices and one chooses one’s 
company (Arendt, 1992, p. 74). 
 
 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu performs this “putting oneself in others’ shoes” and thus 
creates an “enlarged mentality” in the public sphere. To exemplify this, we can look 
at an event they called the “subcontractor lottery.” The “lottery,” which they called 
a “dark comedy,” underlined the fact that our livelihood can only be enhanced by 
our labor, not by empty dreams like games of chance. In order to attract attention 
to subcontractors’ need to fill cadres, they prepared lottery tickets that had the 
word “cadre” written on them. However, at the end of the drawing, no one got 
“hired” into the cadre33. In a similar vein, they organized a charity sale for Texim 
workers and defined it as an event that combined “class struggle” “solidarity” and 
“charity”34. Also, they organized an “iftar” [breaking the fast] with workers of 
Roseteks (a textile company) to support their struggle to receive their salaries and 
compensation35. 
 
İftar is one of the events that the movement uses to carry out its public activities. 
The movement has initiated a number of different kinds of iftar events. They 
organized three “iftars in front of hotels” [otel önü iftarları] that protested the 
luxurious iftars that were taking place inside those hotels, presenting their own 
iftars as alternatives to such conspicuous consumption. They argued that an iftar 
                                                                                                                                                                    
33 http://www.emekveadalet.org/haberyorum/taseron-piyangosunun-sonuclari-belli-oldu/ 
 
34 http://www.emekveadalet.org/haberyorum/texim-iscileri-ile-dayanisma-kermesi/ 
 
35 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/roseteks-iscilerini-ziyaret-ve-iftar/ 
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could not be reduced to entertainment for the rich, but rather should be performed 
in solidarity with the hungry people of the earth36. Emek ve Adalet Platformu 
organized their first iftar action at the park in front of Conrad Hotel37, the second 
one at the exit of Gezi Park (located in front of three five-star hotels: Ceylan 
Intercontinental, Divan and Hyatt Regency Hotels)38 and the third one at the same 
place39. In addition to “iftars in front of hotels” they also organized “fraternal iftars” 
[kardeşlik iftarları] to come together with disadvantaged groups in society. At such 
iftars, members of of Emek ve Adalet Platformu broke their fast with migrants, 
homeless people and workers40 with the motto “we have come to set up our table 
on the ground to resist those who would parcel off what God has given us in this 
world” [dünya nimetlerini parselleyenlere inat yeryüzü sofralarını açmaya geldik]41.  
 
Their solidarity with homeless people was not limited to organizing iftars. They also 
gathered at Taksim square and in front of Eyüp Sultan Mosque in order to bring the 
problems of the homeless people to the attention of the public. At an event they 
called “If One of Us Is Cold, All of Us Are Cold” [birimiz üşürse, hepimiz üşür], they 
spent the night outside together with homeless people to argue that there should 
be facilities in İstanbul to host these people throughout the whole year42. In 
addition to this, they organized several charity sales for homeless people43. 
 
 
36 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/%E2%80%9Cagzinizin-tadini-bozmaya-
geldik%E2%80%9D/ 
 
37 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/otelonu-iftarlari-1-3-agustos-cumartesi/ 
 
38 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/otelonu-iftarlari-2-13-agustos-cumartesi-taksim-gezi-
parki-cikisi/ 
 
39 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/ucuncu-otelonu-iftarimizi-gerceklestirdik/ 
 
40 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/kardeslik-iftarlari-2012-e-bulten/ 
 
41 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/kardeslikiftarlarietha/ 
 
42 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/birmiz-usurse-hepimiz-usuruz-3-kisa-bir-ozet-ve-basin-
metnimiz/ 
 
43 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/3-kermesinardindan/;  
http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/2-evsizler-evi-yardim-kermesinin-ardindan/ 
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Urban regeneration is another issue that the movement has opposed through 
activism. In this regard, they performed neighborhood visits to discuss and observe 
the destructive effects of urban regeneration and to act in solidarity with the local 
population affected by the projects. Thus they went to neighborhoods like 
Tozkoparan44, Cumhuriyet Mahallesi45 and Sarıgöl Mahallesi46. In 2015, the 
movement also issued a declaration for peace together with the Anti-Capitalist 
Muslims movement (Anti Kapitalist Müslümanlar) and the Muslims Initiative Against 
Violence Toward Women [Kadına Şiddete Karşı Müslümanlar İnisiyatifi] to underline 
the necessity for building peace and establishing proper legal recourse for victims. 
In this sense, in the declaration, the movement asked, together with its partners, 
that the state not use armed force against civilians, that the PKK declare a cease-fire 
and that the peace process be conducted in a transparent way47.     
 
Lastly, the movement’s participation in Labor Day is a unique interpretation of 
solidarity with workers and against capitalism. In conformance with their Islamic 
makeup, for example, on May 1st 2012, Emek ve Adalet Platformu participated in a 
funeral prayer at Fatih Mosque for workers who died from occupational accidents. 
After this more Islamic act, various members of the group marched individually 
among the different leftist groupings at the May demonstrations, including the 
parade of the Has Party, the Struggle against Capitalism  Organization [Kapitalizmle 
Mücadele Derneği] and the Association for Solidarity with Subcontractor Workers 
[Taşeron İşçileri Dayanışma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği]48. As a part of their stand 
against capitalism they also organized a protest that targeted banks. In this action 
 
 
44 http://www.emekveadalet.org/haberyorum/tozkoparan-ahalisi-rantsal-donusume-hayir/ 
 
45 http://www.emekveadalet.org/haberyorum/cumhuriyet-mahallesi-riske-imza-atmiyoruz/ 
 
46 http://www.emekveadalet.org/haberyorum/sarigol-mahallesi-danistay-riskli-alan-kararini-hukuka-
aykiri-buldu/ 
47 http://www.emekveadalet.org/genel/sessiz-kalmiyoruz-zulme-ortak-olmuyoruz-2/ 
 
48 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/1-mayis/ 
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they left fake leeches on the doors of several banks along Karaköy’s Bankalar 
Caddesi, underlining the exploitation carried out by the banks and depicting them 
as “leeches” that suck away the people’s resources49.      
 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu demonstrates a democratic ethos through these social 
practices by bringing together different perspectives to the public sphere and 
contributing to the emergence of a public clash of ideologies. From an Arendtian 
perspective, this clash between differences is a fruitful one that pushes people to 
look at different issues than they are used to and to think from different 
perspectives. In this respect, the result of an enlarged mentality means that a 
democratic ethos overcomes its limitations as an internal, contemplative mode of 
thinking by helping actors carry it out through action in the field. The meeting of 
differences can challenge participatory and performative boundaries in the public 
sphere, while the enlarged mentality can bring new perceptions and awareness that 
can decrease the fear of the other. In this regard, the social practices performed by 
the movement are great sources of plurality, helping in the expansion of the public 
sphere as well as in the development of a democratic culture. Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu attracts attention to the contradictions and injustices in the social life by 
criticizing social impasses with their actions and performances. The movement 
expands existing perceptions by making others witness the subaltern stories and 
drawing individuals into a learning process. Thus it creates a ground to transcend 
the existing political and ideological belongings and construct a more inclusive 
definition of the term “us”.    
 
4.5 Democratic Ethos both Outside and Inside: A Paradox 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu is a movement that sought to develop a democratic 
character and supported this character with action in practice; it displays solidarity 
with subalterns, disadvantaged groups and people who have been subjected to 
poor treatment. In the public sphere, the movement aims to create an egalitarian 
space for the equal participation of different groups and promotes plurality. From 
                                                                                                                                                                    
49 http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/bankalara-suluklu-protestonun-ardindan/ 
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this aspect, the relationship of the movement with ‘outside’ can be characterized by 
the existence of a democratic ethos. On the other hand, however, when we look at 
the inner structure and relationships within the movement, at some points, we 
encounter a paradox. Within the inner structure of the movement, the freedom and 
equality it professes in public can be limited or blurred when it comes to certain 
issues. To put it differently, while the movement aims to establish a democratic 
ethos outside, it fails to some extent to exhibit it on the inside. This contradiction 
has caused a paradox, which will be the topic of this section.  
 
Emek ve Adalet Platformu argues that it is not a self-enclosed organization, but 
rather an organization that keeps its door open to people from all ideological 
backgrounds. It is disputable, however, whether this stance brings about actual 
diversity in terms of its members’ profiles. For example, according to Fatma, there is 
an ideological variety among the movement’s members, but this variety exists 
essentially within the realm of Islamic thought [İslami düşünce]. Most of the 
members of the organization belong to the Turk-Sunni tradition. In this sense, 
Fatma and her husband, who belong to the founding cadre of the movement, 
remain as typical examples: 
Well, if I had to describe the diversity, it is more of a diversity within Islamist 
thought. For example, there are friends who think in a more statist way, 
while there are others who say that the state is bad. Some find the issue of 
schools of Islam more important, others less. For some tradition is 
important, for others not, and so on. It has its own diversity within it.     
 
Mehmet expands on Fatma’s qualification of the ideological profile of the 
movement’s members. Nevertheless, he does so from a different angle, asserting 
that there is little class-based diversity among the movement’s members. Mehmet 
argues that Emek ve Adalet Platformu consists of a middle-class mass. Tarık, on the 
other hand, insists that there is a variety among members: 
 
There is diversity. But we are also concerned that this diversity has 
decreased. […] We have a variety in that there are lower and middle classes. 
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[…] Even if initially I had thought that we were mostly from conservative 
families, I mean those that form the core AK Party constituency, over time I 
realized it was not actually like that. Now I see that there are families which 
considered the AK Party to be un-Islamic [İslam dışı] and who included 
revolutionary Muslim practices in their lives. […] However, the fact that 
there has been a decrease in the number of Marxists in comparison to the 
beginning phase [of the movement] has meant a decrease in variety. So the 
[overall] diversity may have indeed decreased as a result. […] But I still think 
there is variety. Because there are lots of debates, discussions, conflicts. I 
mean one of us might be disturbed if someone uses the word “Kurdistan”, 
while another one might refer to Abdullah Öcalan as a source. So there is 
variety and because of this we still have issues that we cannot openly 
discuss.  
 
According to Tarık, opinion-based conflicts, discussions, and debates cause difficulty 
in forming a shared movement discourse on some issues. This, for him, is evidence 
that points to diversity. For Fatma, however, this conflictual atmosphere on some 
issues is not an indicator of variety; it is the consequence of members’ slowness in 
comprehending the movement’s mission due to the amplitude of the things that 
have to be learned and differences in ideological backgrounds: 
 
Every Thursday we have structured conversations [söyleşiler]. For example, 
while we speak about the labor issue at one week, the next week we might 
talk about, say, the Iranian Revolution. The volume of the things that we 
have to learn is so huge and so different from one another, that this makes 
us go more slowly and makes it more difficult for us to understand the 
issues. Of course, when you add the fact that there are people who do not 
feed [ideologically] from the same source—for example on the Kurdish issue, 
there is a natural sympathy on the left for the Kurdish issue, but the other 
side has a more Turkish identity or mentality, and criticizes the issue in line 
with that. So these two poles collide as a result.  
 
Based on my interviews, I found that, despite the claims to diversity, the movement 
faces numerous constraints in terms of reaching a wide variety of people. First, the 
movement displays a monolithic structure which makes the entrance of different 
people to the movement more difficult. I argue that this is the case, even though 
my interviewees showed initial resistance to this idea. Fatma explains: 
 
Right now I consider myself an exception in the Emek ve Adalet Platformu. 
When Mehmet e-mailed us about the interview, Salih (her husband) told me 
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that he did not represent a sample there (in the organization). Because he is 
Kurdish-Alevi. But most of us come from the Turkish-Sunni tradition. I call 
myself a Muslim, but in terms of lifestyle I am not a religious person. 
[…] His [Salih's participation in the movement] is extremely exceptional. [But 
Salih can be there] because he has been there since the movement was 
founded. After Salih, nobody else [like him] came. Because Salih has been 
close friends with everybody since the movement was established; he is sort 
of able to keep being there. He's there because he was a founding member. 
And this could be considered a critique of Emek Adalet, so it's important in 
your understanding of the movement. When a Kurdish Alevi comes to us 
now, I'm not entirely sure how comfortable they [Kurdish Alevis] feel 
expressing themselves. 
 
Similarly, Mehmet explains that while, initially, the movement was an initiative 
driven by its leftist members, the relationships with the leftists worsened over time, 
and the limited cadres who were there during the founding of the movement left. 
He asserts that the movement “gradually has become more Islamist” as a result of 
this departure. Mehmet describes this shift by referring to fellow member of the 
movement: “Ahmet said it well: ‘Once I was a leftist who felt sympathy for Islamists; 
now I have become an Islamist who feels sympathy for the leftists.’ You can’t say it 
more concisely than that”.  
 
Fatma also argues that there was a shift in the movement between its founding and 
today:  
At first, Emek ve Adalet Platformu was a place where both leftists and 
Islamists could come. The four of us were there, people who came from the 
left and thought alike. There was something like that then, but I don’t think 
it’s like that anymore. … [When the platform began] it seemed to be a kind 
of transitional form that attempted to create a link between leftists and 
Islamists. 
 
As it can be seen from these statements an Islamic structure is at the forefront in 
the movement. However, Mehmet does not see this as an evidence that the 
movement is insular self-enclosed [dışa kapalı]. He argues that the movement’s 
organizational structure, operational processes and style of action keep them open 
to outside participation. Nevertheless, at the end of our conversation, regarding this 
issue, Mehmet did raise a new point: “[The issue of] self-enclosure is not an easy 
discussion but I can tell that our intent and our effort are visible in trying to 
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overcome it”. And he adds: “The question on being cut off from the outside has two 
aspects. We have met very few people who are willing to meet up as much as we 
are, either specifically at Boğaziçi50 or more generally with our experience in Emek 
ve Adalet Platformu”. Thus, he emphasizes that even if the movement is open to 
new people, if other people are not open to the movement, there will not be a 
change.  
 
Barış also underlines the Islamic sensibilities in the movement and summarizes this 
as follows: “We can say that the movement is open to all groups. This is a main 
condition. How can I formulate what I’m trying to say? This isn’t the way to write it, 
but not being an enemy of religion or of the people. That is the main criterion”.  
 
On the other hand, Ayşe interprets the issue of the movement’s openness from a 
different angle:  
 
The door is open to everyone but, like it or not, even if the door is open, not 
everyone comes. I mean, at its most basic, Emek Adalet is a group that 
establishes its discourse on the basis of Islam. It gives importance to some 
issues more than the others. Like it or not, maybe because it has limited 
energy or for other reasons. […] If Emek Adalet talks less about Kurdish issue 
than labor issue, naturally, the customer—to use a term from business—of 
Emek Adalet would be different. Different people would come. No one tells 
a newcomer to go, but the movement determines the kind of people who 
will come, without really being aware of it, through the things that it is 
interested in.     
 
Along with Islamic sensibilities, the centrality of issues related to labor is a second 
signifier in the actions of the movement. From this aspect, Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu has a discourse that “puts labor and capitalism at the center” and is a 
structure that attributes constituent importance to social justice (Mehmet). It is a 
movement that had its starting point trying to “grapple with the unjust treatment 
created by the capitalist and neoliberal system” (Tarık). As a consequence of this 
sensibility, it consists of “a team that seeks to work hand in hand with the labor 
                                                                                                                                                                    
50 Boğaziçi University: One of the most prestigious universities in Turkey. 
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movement” (Mehmet). Supporting Tarık and Mehmet, Fatma, too, emphasizes the 
importance of labor in their agenda: “In Emek ve Adalet the interest in the labor 
issue has always been a bit higher”. In this regard, Fatma criticizes the movement. “I 
have many criticisms,” Fatma told me. “For example, we remain passive on the 
Kurdish issue and on the Alevi issue. Unfortunately, our colleagues from an Islamic 
background spend less effort [on these issues] compared to those who come from 
the left”. 
 
Thus here we see a hierarchy among the issues that make up the agenda of the 
movement, with labor at the top of it. When I asked my interviewees the stance 
taken by the movement regarding minorities like Kurds and Alevis in Turkey, they 
told me their personal ideas but explained that the movement did not produce an 
official discourse on the issues that it cannot have any effect on. To clarify this 
argument we can look at what Barış said: “if you’re not the legitimate 
representative of [an issue] the most you can do is maybe to express your opinion”. 
Ali carries this argument a step further: “We [as a movement] do not speak on 
anyone else’s behalf”. Sometimes, however, such selectivity has side-effects, 
including talking only about the same specific issues— in this case, the labor issue—
at the expense of others. For example, where the movement stands in terms of 
solidarity with the LGBTI movement is ambiguous, particularly because of the 
limitations caused by the movement’s religious sensibilities. Such silence makes 
victimization of some people invisible. For example, it is hard to know if a trans-
woman murder would be on the agenda of the movement. Thus, the movement 
creates a hierarchy between various kinds of unjust treatment and discriminates 
different identities.     
 
To elaborate on this point let us look at the answers of my respondents. First, 
Mehmet explains that due to Islamic sensibilities, the movement does not seek to 
include members of various sexual identities: 
 
[…] LGBT people remain on the outside. That’s an issue that’s not really up 
for discussion. On that issue—I mean, when it comes to social justice, we 
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manage to have a discussion—but for Muslims to have a real discussion 
about the LGBT issue, an open one that isn’t just a reference to the liberal 
literature, is very difficult.  
 
Similarly, in our conversation on this issue, Tarık answered my question whether 
LGBTI individuals felt comfortable in the movement, as follows:     
 
We have never had to deal with such a difficult test. I do not want to put too 
fine a point on it, since nobody who was homosexual or who was visibly 
different has ever joined [the movement], but as I far as I know from my 
homosexual friends, I assume that they would feel comfortable in this 
environment. But on the other hand, whether people feel comfortable or 
not is related to their own background and experiences. One of our 
members, for example, came from an upper-class Kemalist family and never 
had any exposure to Islamic circles, and said adapting to the movement was 
hard. I mean, so, these things can happen. Even if you are theoretically open, 
such things can happen without you realizing it, things like difficulty in 
adaption can happen. […] I don’t know, for instance, if someone comes and 
sees so many head-scarved women, and men whose Islamic values are at 
the foreground, I presume that they might be a bit taken aback. Even if it 
[the movement] isn’t actually that homogeneous, it has the appearance of 
homogeneity. 
 
In a similar vein with Tarık, who believes such an encounter would be a “test,” Ali 
also used the “test” as a metaphor when replying to my question of whether the 
movement’s attitude toward the participation of a head-scarved woman and a 
homosexual would be the same: “I do not know, I could not test this.” Then he 
added:  
 
No one comes without baggage. Everybody comes with a religious code in 
the background or some other code. Someone who comes [to us] may not 
be compatible with this baggage. […] Of course we don’t say, ‘Hey, that guy’s 
gay, let’s not do what he says.’ […] We might do things together [with LGBTI-
rights organizations] if we agree on them, but on other issues we might do 
things on our own. […] Even if there are some tensions they even out after a 
while and they come to a balance. The relationship is normalized. […] I 
mean, if a homosexual were to come to us and say, ‘Hey guys, I’m a 
homosexual,’ we would sit down and talk about it. We would have to come 
up with something to say, because it would be an incident. We should be 
able to talk about this issue freely, but up to now nobody [homosexual] has 
come [to us].   
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Ayşe also believes that an LGBTI individual would not feel at home in the 
movement, saying: 
 
They may not feel comfortable in Emek ve Adalet Platformu. For sure Emek 
ve Adalet support LGBT people to defend their rights. But because of some 
issues stemming from Islamic codes—I mean, a Muslim as an individual 
would definitely speak up against unjust treatments—but frankly I wouldn’t 
say that they would be particularly enthusiastic about supporting political 
action on this issue. 
 
With regard to the movement’s approach to gender issues, we might look at the 
distribution of women in the movement as well as their roles. According to 
Mehmet, women outnumber male members in the movement. On the other hand, 
Tarık asserts that the number of women who are active participants is low:  
 
There used to be few women, or more precisely, there was only ever a small 
number of women who were truly active. There are maybe 5-10 people who 
actively deal with everything. […] and of this core 10 people, there used to 
be only a few women. Thankfully this has changed in the last few months. 
Neşe came to us from Özgür Açılım, Betül came to us. Before them, there 
weren’t too many active women other than Fatma, Ayşe or Hale. […] As a 
result, the number of women is still lower. […] Most of the time Fatma or 
Hale might have been the only women at the meeting, and it’s possible that 
they weren’t comfortable there. They never expressed any discomfort, but 
that’s why we have to take care not to create an overly masculine 
environment.  
 
Like Tarık, Fatma explains the domination of active male participants as follows: 
“Actually the number of women mobilizing isn’t that bad. It might not be half-half, 
but it’s close. But men are in the clear majority when it comes to people doing 
active work, taking real responsibilities.”  
 
Very much opposed to these views, however, Ayşe argues that there are more male 
participants than women participants: “There are more men. I don’t know if this is 
the case just for Emek Adalet or if it’s true for all movements like this, but there are 
more men.” Following this discussion, I asked Ayşe if it was hard to be a woman in 
the movement. She said no, that it was easy. I then asked if I would be comfortable 
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in the movement as a person who does not wear a headscarf. She explained that 
the movement is making an effort in order to be more inclusive and use a discourse 
to embrace differences. 
 
The movement tries to have this kind of [inclusive] discourse. But I do not 
know, frankly, to what extent it realizes this. Maybe somebody on the 
outside could observer this more easily. […] Maybe Fatma can answer this 
question more easily regarding how she feels. That would make more sense.  
 
As a head-scarfed woman Ayşe admitted that she cannot understand if there was a 
prejudice regarding headscarf issue. Hence in my interview with Fatma, I repeated 
my question regarding the hardships of being a woman. I also asked what it was like 
being a woman without a headscarf. She gave a remarkable answer:   
 
It’s not [hard] for me. Maybe this is because I have been there since the 
beginning. I am older than most of them. I have the position of quote-
unquote older sister. It is not hard for me. But this, I don’t know—being the 
only woman who does not have a headscarf. Actually there is another 
member too, but let’s say among the more active ones. You do not have to 
write what I’m saying if you want. I do not know. Sometimes you feel 
awkward. But there is nothing specific there that would make you feel that 
way. 
 
[…] For example if we invite a guest [to one of our meetings], they think 
they’re entering a Muslim community. Then they see me, some of them do; 
but some of them do not. I can’t say that I have never felt it or sometimes 
felt it. I feel [people thinking] ‘She does not wear a headscarf’. But after a 
certain point, it’s not really that important. 
 
As can be seen from my interviewees’ responses, the movement experiences a 
paradox when it comes to protecting the democratic ethos inside the movement. By 
shifting to a more Islamic line, it has lost some of the variety it once displayed. 
Moreover, it has been transformed into a movement that displays different tones of 
Islamism, so when respondents discuss diversity within the movement, they 
generally refer to the variety of Islamic views. In addition to this, males also 
dominate the movement. The number of women who takes part in the movement’s 
active political activities is very limited. This monolithic structure blocks the 
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participation of people with new perspectives, leading to a loss in egalitarian soul 
and hence damage to the movement’s internal democratic ethos.  
 
Secondly, the Islamic sensibilities of the movement and the centrality of the labor 
issue create hierarchies among disadvantaged and marginalized people. As a 
consequence of this situation, issues like LGBTI rights violations, ethnic minorities or 
the feminist struggle are not basic issues that are on the agenda of the movement. 
Since they center on the labor struggle, the movement exhibits practices and 
actions that contribute to the freedom and equality of the working class, but it faces 
the problem of disconnectedness with other social problems and segments, and 
also risk of repeating the same discourse for the same issues while becoming blind 
to others, like murders of transsexuals or Alevi rights.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I defined public sphere based on the discussion presented in Hannah 
Arendt’s work. Arendt defines the public sphere as a “space of appearances” where 
individuals integrate themselves into politics via their actions and words to 
overcome existing inequalities. For Arendt, the public sphere is a stage of plurality, 
equality and freedom. Emek ve Adalet Platformu is a movement that has brought 
religious and socialist sensibilities to the public sphere and presents different ideas 
on social justice, equality, labor and exploitation. It expresses itself in this “space of 
appearances” by displaying a genuine character and as an actor there it contributes 
to discursive plurality by presenting additional perspectives. In addition to this, the 
movement also challenges the official public sphere and constitutes its own 
counterpublic in order to be seen and recognized by others. In the section which 
followed, I therefore discussed the ways in which the movement fits into Nancy 
Fraser’s concept of “counterpublic.” Related to the discussion of counterpublic, I 
introduced the concept of “democratic ethos” based on the work of William 
Connolly and Peter Euben. I argue that Emek ve Adalet Platformu displays a 
democratic ethos in the public sphere, and, from an Arenditian perspective, I argue 
that this is the way through which the movement offers an enlarged mentality to 
the public sphere. However, along with these contributions to the public sphere, 
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the movement exhibits a paradox in its inner structures and relationships. 
Examining this contradiction in the final section of the chapter, I demonstrate, using 
the words of movement members themselves, that despite the democratic ethos 
established on the outside, the movement suffers from male domination, a 
monolithic structure, heteronormativity and a narrow ideological focus that lead it 
to establish hierarchies between social problems. Even as the movement 
contributes to plurality in the public sphere in some ways, in other ways, the lack of 
internal diversity leads the movement to obscure certain social and political 
injustices. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The question of how and to what extent religion-based arguments can be used in 
the public sphere to promote social justice and equality lies at the heart of this 
thesis. Religion, which focuses on salvation in the afterlife, and ideologies 
promoting social justice in this world, like leftism, are often seen as incompatible. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has demonstrated that there are concrete ways in which 
religion and the left can be employed together discursively in the public sphere. 
Hannah Arendt locates the public sphere as a performance ground on which people, 
by action and speech, reach a unique identity and produce a meaningful “human 
artifice”—all that which makes us human. Inspired by Arendt’s argumentation, in 
this thesis, I have focused on the words and deeds of one leftist Islamic organization 
in Turkey, Emek ve Adalet Platformu, as a concrete example of how the discussion 
of Islam and the left occurs in the public sphere. 
 
My thesis first sought to establish the broader context for this case study by 
comparing historical and intellectual attempts to combine religion and the left. One 
of these, Liberation Theology, is an example of togetherness between Christianity 
and socialism. Similar attempts to combine religion and socialism took place in the 
Islamic world, with individuals like Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, Ali Shariati and 
Mustafa Sibai reinterpreting socialism with Islam as a guide against the inequalities 
and injustices of this world. In Turkey, this role was taken on by names like Nurettin 
Topçu and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı. In Turkey, “sol ilahiyat” became a controversial topic, 
with both detractors and supporters. Meanwhile, a challenge to a combination of 
religion and the left also emerged in the form of a new “Muslim capitalism”, which 
has created an identity crisis for those religious segments who continued to be 
concerned with justice and who based their ideas on the notion of equality. 
Similarly, socialists in response to the capitalist challenge began to question their 
own position and put their own political identity up for discussion. 
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Thus, I argued that with the ongoing identity crisis and with political Islam’s 
popularity in Turkey, the production of an oppositional and egalitarian discourse 
from within religious circles that emulates socialism emerged at the same time as a 
new orientation within the left that did not demonize religion. This approach—sol 
ilahiyat—has created a new ground of understanding and contemplation. Sol 
ilahiyat emphasizes that Islam cannot be used as a mechanism of achieving political 
power and argues that the way Islam is lived today does not correspond to its 
original calling. Because it neither turns its back on Islam nor the left, sol ilahiyat 
constitutes a fertile ground for discussion (Durak, 2012, p. 85). 
 
One of the movements that carries out a strategy of struggle and resistance on this 
fertile ground is Emek ve Adalet Platformu. This movement criticizes capitalism by 
referring to Quran and embraces socialist values with its emphasis on labor, 
equality and a life without exploitation. In this thesis, I argue that Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu represents a concrete example for discussions of sol ilahiyat in Turkey in 
the public sphere. In Chapter 3, I introduced the movement by creating a kind of 
“identity card for the movement” and located its role in the Turkish public sphere. 
Based on the responses of my interviewees (2 female, 4 male) and the movement’s 
own writings, I explored the ways Emek ve Adalet Platformu takes decisions, the 
organization of the movement, the profiles of its participants and the political 
stance they take.  
 
Keeping this identity analysis in mind, I located Emek ve Adalet Platformu in the 
public sphere as a representative of “sol ilahiyat” in Turkey. Although the public 
sphere is a critical component of society, as a stage of actions, practices and 
performances, an integrated discussion of sol ilahiyat within the concept of “public 
sphere” is largely missing in the existing literature. To fill this gap, I first examined 
the public sphere, finding Arendt’s definition to be most appropriate. For Arendt, 
the public sphere is the space between individuals; political action is the element 
that provides either the establishment or preservation of this space; and human 
plurality is the constitutive element of the political world (Villa, 2008, p. 309). I 
argued that Emek ve Adalet Platformu can be viewed as one of the civil society 
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institutions that aim to achieve such plurality and possibilities of interaction in the 
Turkish public sphere. The movement presents different ideas on exploitation, 
labor, social justice, equality and other topics with a focus on the slogan “against 
the enslavement and exploitation of God’s servants”. However, along with this 
plurality they have brought to the official public sphere, I assert that they also 
constitute their own public sphere, something which I defined as a subaltern 
counterpublic, borrowing a term from Nancy Fraser.  
 
I argue that the movement is located on the subaltern, first because their way of 
embracing Islam and their criticism towards ruling AK Party government puts Islam 
at its discursive center, and second because they criticize capitalism in their actions 
and discourse and point to social justice outside of the state as an inherent part of 
Islam. Thus Emek ve Adalet Platformu creates a “parallel discursive arena” where it 
“circulates counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of its 
identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 1992, p. 123).  
 
In the next section, I argue that Emek ve Adalet Platformu’s challenge of dominant 
discourse creates a “democratic ethos” through the attempt to broaden 
interlocutors’ intellectual horizons. The movement has created a plurality and multi-
vocality in the public sphere, reaching out to different identities and creating bonds 
of solidarity with them. The movement goes beyond settled identities and 
empathizes with different identities like workers, homeless people and migrants. It 
cooperates with subaltern people, disadvantaged groups and groups exposed to 
unjust treatment. Emek ve Adalet Platformu also establishes an intellectual space 
for this ethos. The movement represents a structure that aims to promote learning 
and mutual and deliberative discussion on a variety of topics.  
 
Interconnected to creating a democratic ethos, the movement also enlarges 
mentalities by creating a ground for the communication and interaction of different 
identities. It does so through activities like the subcontractor lottery, charity sales, 
shared iftars [breaking the fast], gatherings to attract attention to the problems of 
homeless people and migrants and neighborhood visits to struggle against 
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gentrification. In this regard, the social practices carried out by the movement are 
great sources of plurality, helping in the expansion of the public sphere as well as in 
the development of a democratic culture. Emek ve Adalet Platformu attracts 
attention to the contradictions and injustices in society by criticizing social 
stalemates through their actions and performances. Thus it creates a ground to 
transcend existing political and ideological belongings and construct a more 
inclusive definition of the term “we”. 
 
When we look at the inner structure and relationships within the movement, 
however, at some points, we encounter a paradox. Within the inner structure of the 
movement, the freedom and equality it professes in public can be limited or blurred 
when it comes to certain issues. To put it differently, while the movement aims to 
establish a democratic ethos outside, it fails to some extent to exhibit it on the 
inside. By shifting to a more Islamic line, it has lost some of the variety it once 
displayed. Moreover, it has been transformed into a movement that displays 
different tones of Islamism, so when respondents discuss diversity within the 
movement, they generally refer to the variety of Islamic views. In addition to this, 
men dominate the movement. The number of women who take part in the 
movement’s active political activities is very limited. This monolithic structure 
blocks the participation of people with new perspectives, leading to a loss in 
egalitarian spirit and a degradation of the movement’s internal democratic ethos.  
 
Secondly, the Islamic sensibilities of the movement and the centrality of the labor 
issue create hierarchies among subaltern stances and forms of injustice. As a 
consequence of this situation, issues like LGBTI rights violations, ethnic minorities or 
the feminist struggle are not basic issues that are on the agenda of the movement. 
Since they center on the labor struggle, the movement exhibits practices and 
actions that contribute to the freedom and equality of the working class, but it faces 
the problem of disconnectedness with other social problems and segments, and 
also risk of repeating the same discourse for the same issues while remaining blind 
to others, like the murders of transsexuals. With a wide variety of other issues, like 
Alevi rights or murders of women, it has only limited ties. Thus, while Emek ve 
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Adalet Platformu has had an important role to play in the inclusion of new religious-
based arguments in the quest for social justice, a truly plural and multi-vocal public 
sphere in Turkey will naturally require the addition of new, more interconnected 
actors. 
 
The fieldwork for this thesis was carried out at a time of particularly intensive 
activity for Emek ve Adalet Platformu. Four years later, what has become of the 
movement? Answering this question would undoubtedly require continued 
fieldwork. The representation of Emek ve Adalet Platformu is very limited in Turkish 
media outlets, so any information regarding the movement’s current actions must 
be collected from its website and social media accounts. I could claim that the 
number of the actions carried out by the platform has gone down in comparison to 
recent years and the intensity of the platform’s work also appeared to have waned. 
The changing political climate in Turkey, in particular the state’s increased control of 
the public sphere as a result of the ongoing state of emergency, could be one of the 
reasons for this change. Such speculation, however, could be the scope of further 
academic studies and must be confirmed or disproven by further field studies.  
 
On the other hand as an actor in the public sphere, the platform has clearly 
remained true to its core message still promotes a democratic ethos, enlarges 
mentalities and creates bonds of solidarity, especially with the working class. As in 
recent years, this year too, the movement marched with representatives of the 
working class on May Day.51 In the social media accounts of the platforms there are 
several tweets in support of the resistance of workers on strike or families of 
affected by the Soma disaster52. Emek ve Adalet Platformu still organizes fast-
breaking activities with the aim of constituting a more inclusive public for their 
ideology. In line with their critical and oppositional character in Turkish public 
sphere, the slogan for this year’s fast-breaking was “Let’s Meet for a ‘Down-to-Earth 
                                                                                                                                                                    
51 http://www.emekveadalet.org/duyurular/kula-kulluga-ve-somuruye-karsi-1-mayista-alanlardayiz/ 
 
52 https://twitter.com/emekadalet 
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Meal’ to Spite Those who Parcel the Social Will and who Polarize the Nation” 
[Toplumsal İradeyi Parselleyenlere, Milleti Kutuplaştıranlara İnat Yeryüzü Sofrasında 
Buluşalım].53 The killing of workers by employer negligence, the worsening situation 
of the working class, unbalanced growth in capitalist classes, urban regeneration 
and problems of injustice in Turkey are still issues that are on the agenda of the 
movement54. As a continuation of its cooperation with disadvantaged groups and 
groups exposed to unjust treatments, the movement still criticizes the AK Party 
government and raises opposition against the polarization in Turkey while 
demanding peace and social consensus55. Thus based on the existing data regarding 
the stance of movement, I believe there has not been a serious shift in the last years 
despite the pressures on its level of activity; the movement still keeps its critical 
distance from the state, preserves the soul of empathizing with different identities, 
represents plurality and multi-vocality and promotes deliberative discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
53http://www.emekveadalet.org/duyurular/toplumsal-iradeyi-parselleyenlere-milleti-
kutuplastiranlara-inat-yeryuzu-sofrasinda-bulusalim-sozun-ve-istisarenin-onunu-acalim/ 
 
54 http://www.emekveadalet.org/yeni/adil-bir-parlemento-icin-irademize-sahip-cikalim/ 
 
55 http://www.emekveadalet.org/genel/ucurumdan-donelim/ 
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